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JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE
DISAPPEARING DISTINCTION
BETWEEN WILL INTERPRETATION AND
CONSTRUCTION
Richard F. Storrowt
INTRODUCTION
The law is no stranger to disputes over the meaning of language.
Though legal documents generally "ought to be so plain as not to
require interpretation,"' lawyers tend to agree that language is
essentially an imperfect tool for the task to which it is put.2 Despite
their meticulous planning, preparation, and attention to detail, drafters
of wills, contracts, and even statutes know intimately how difficult it
is to foresee the future and plan for all possible eventualities. These
same drafters express surprise when a court construes their carefully
crafted language as reflective of an intention that was never
contemplated. On the one hand, language is imperfect because it fails
as a tool of prognostication. On the other hand, language is imperfect
because it fails to live up to a role it should play-to serve as a set of
signs capable of representing an author's intention. Given the
paramount importance of intention in the law of wills, this latter
imperfection of language makes responsible estate planning a perilous
undertaking.
The role of the judiciary in interpreting and construing wills has
undergone a radical transformation in recent years. At the end of the
nineteenth century, treatises on will interpretation were crowded with
t© 2005 Richard Storrow. Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University. J.D., Colum-
bia Law School, 1993; M.A., Columbia University, 1989; B.A., Miami University, 1987. I thank
Pennsylvania State University and Texas Wesleyan University for the research support that
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I Frances Vaughan Hawkins, On the Principles of Legal Interpretation, with Reference
Especially to the Interpretation of Wills, reprinted in JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 577, 578 (1898).
2 Id.
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ultraspecific rules of construction, seemingly geared to establishing
the meaning of any turn of phrase a testator might use in the course of
designing his estate plan. As if meaning to codify the correct interpre-
tation of every conceivable combination of words that might appear
in a will, these tomes embodied the epitome of formalistic will inter-
pretation by elevating the concept of plain language almost to the
level of high art.
Because of a growing distrust and dissatisfaction with the applica-
tion of hidebound interpretive rules to testamentary documents, the
law of will interpretation has gradually evolved from a stiff and often
artificial formalism to an almost organic approach to interpretation
that extols the quest for the testator's intention.3 Courts today, seeking
to temper technical rigidity, contemplate a reduced role for the appli-
cation of rules of construction in the wills context, with the trend to-
ward admitting extrinsic evidence to cure a multiplicity of ills in
wills.4 In the course of this evolution, the use of will interpretation
manuals has fallen from favor and the rules governing the admission
of extrinsic evidence have been increasingly relaxed and refined.
Modern codifications of will interpretation methods are remarkably
brief and appear to have abandoned any pretense that a will's mean-
ing can be divined through the mere application of a series of formal-
istic rules.5 Reflecting this new understanding, some courts have gone
as far as to announce that precedent is not controlling in will interpre-
tation matters.6 Without stare decisis as a guide, and without seman-
tics as an unassailable benchmarking tool, the quest to locate a testa-
See In re Estate of Russell, 444 P.2d 353, 359 (1968) (explaining that "'[t]he history of
the law of Interpretation is the history of a progress from a stiff and superstitious formalism to a
flexible rationalism') (quoting 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 2461, at 187 (3d. ed. 1940)), reprinted in JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON,
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 417,421-22 (6th ed. 2000).
4 See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 421 (describing "the modem develop-
ment of rules governing interpretation").
5 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§§ 10.1, 10.2, 11.1, 11.2 (2003).
6 See In re Estate of Saylors, 671 N.E.2d 905, 908 (Ind. 1996) ("Although [the court]
may be aided by previous cases, the meaning of each will is determined by its own particular
facts."); In re Estate of Thompson, 511 N.W.2d 374, 377-78 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) ("[P]rior
cases are normally of limited value in will-construction cases.... [since] each will-construction
case normally involves a fact situation peculiar unto itself."); Myers v. Kan. Dep't of Soc. &
Rehab. Serv., 866 P.2d 1052, 1058 (Kan. 1994) ("[A]lthough there are certain guiding principles
and rules to be applied by any court, in the final analysis each case depends upon its own par-
ticular facts and language."); Theodore Short Trust v. Fuller, 7 S.W.3d 482, 488 (Mo. Ct. App.
1999) ("The infinite variety of expressions and the differing shades of meaning... make prior
decisions construing similar words or phases of far less value as precedent than those of other
fields of litigated controversies."); Darragh v. Barnore, 242 S.W. 714, 716 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1922) (noting that during the construction of wills, adherence to precedent shall not be rigid
unless it is "in every respect directly in point").
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tor's intent through the words of her testament becomes particularly
perplexing.7 Paradoxically, though, will interpretation is approaching
a legitimacy it did not possess in the past, because this new flexibility
appears to inspire greater confidence in the judiciary's role in will
interpretation.
At the same time, with this shift in interpretive approach comes in-
creasing confusion as to what the judiciary's role is or should be. In
short, a unified notion of what approach should be taken in interpreta-
tion matters is becoming increasingly elusive. Despite the need for
greater clarity in this area, the American Law Institute (ALI), in the
recently completed Restatement (Third) of Property, Wills and Other
Donative Transfers, determines that the distinction between will in-
terpretation and will construction is no longer tenable. Arguing that
the current judicial practice is to consider actual and presumed inten-
tion simultaneously, the new Restatement rejects the view that inter-
pretation and construction are discrete parts of a sequential process. It
proposes a one-step process in which courts will consider extrinsic
evidence and rules of construction simultaneously.
Positing that too flexible interpretive rules and limitless discretion
tempt courts to ignore ambiguities in wills and unjustifiably stream-
line the interpretive process, this Article calls for a renewed under-
standing of the distinction between interpretation and construction
and for a curb on the abusive discretion courts are leveling in will
construction cases. Part I of this Article discusses the process of in-
terpreting wills as it is carried out today. In particular, this Article
explores the continuing vitality of the plain-meaning rule and the role
of extrinsic evidence in resolving problems in identification. The re-
sort of the courts to rules of construction where extrinsic evidence has
failed to illuminate the intent of the testator is also discussed. Part II
examines the conflation of interpretation and construction in the re-
cently updated Restatement with a view toward reinscribing these
functions as distinct processes. Part III of this Article undertakes to
explore what can go wrong in will construction matters where, as a
rule, there is great judicial discretion. A recent will construction mat-
ter involving community property and successive life estates in min-
erals will serve as a platform from which to comment on the value of
the Restatement's proposed reforms. This Article concludes that the
distinction between interpretation and construction should be reaf-
firmed. Without this distinction, courts are vested with excessive dis-
cretion that virtually invites them to flout the principle that, in every
7 See Jane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation, and Stories, 42 DuKE L.J. 630, 638-39
(1992).
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wills case, locating and carrying out the testator's intention is the
primary and paramount concern.
I. THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS
When overseeing the administration of an estate, probate courts
are primarily concerned with ascertaining and carrying out the testa-
tor's intent.8 Courts have used a multiplicity of adjectives to express
the importance of this task,9 describing it variously as "paramount,"' 0
"fundamental,"" "cardinal," 12 "primary," 13 "overarching,"14 "control-
8 See, e.g., Read v. Legg, 493 A.2d 1013, 1016 (D.C. 1985) ("[T]he court's function is to
ascertain the testator's intent."); In re Estate of Grulke, 546 N.W.2d 626, 627 (Iowa Ct. App.
1996) ("It is not [the court's] function to remake or improve a will; rather, our sole purpose and
justification for construing a will is the development of the intent of the testator."); San Antonio
Area Found. v. Lang, 35 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex. 2000) ("In construing a will, the court's focus is
on the testatrix's intent.").
9 Professor Larry Waggoner, a renowned authority on wills and trusts law, once declared
that he would be rich if he were given a nickel for each time a court announced that the primary
goal of wills law is to determine and carry out the intention of the testator. Lawrence W.
Waggoner, Interpreting Different Texts, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS ANNUAL
MEETING, Section on Legislation, 1999 (panel discussion).
10 Aycock Pontiac, Inc. v. Aycock, 983 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Ark. 1998); Newman v. Wells
Fargo Bank, 926 P.2d 969, 973 (Cal. 1996); In re Estate of Anderson, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 313
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997); In re Tyson, 716 So. 2d 148, 150 (La. Ct. App. 1998), Hulett v. First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. in Clinton, 956 P.2d 879, 885 (Okla. 1998); Turner v. Reed, 518 S.E.2d 832,
833 (Va. 1999); In re Estate of Marks, 957 P.2d 235, 241 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998); Charleston
Nat'l Bank v. Thru the Bible Radio Network, 507 S.E.2d 708, 710 (W. Va. 1998); Sweeney v.
Lilly, 479 S.E.2d 863, 865 (W. Va. 1996); In re Estate of Furmanski, 538 N.W.2d 566, 568
(Wis. Ct. App. 1995); In re Estate of Larson, 538 N.W.2d 802, 803 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
1 Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Buckley, 665 N.E.2d 29, 32 (Mass. 1996); Estate of Beatty,
673 A.2d 1325, 1327 (Me. 1996); In re Leighton, 638 A.2d 723, 724 (Me. 1994); Mitchell v.
Lowery, 368 S.E.2d 7, 9 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Hollowell v. Hollowell, 420 S.E.2d 827, 831
(N.C. Ct. App. 1992); Church v. Morgan, 685 N.E.2d 809, 811 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Berry v.
Union Nat'l Bank, 262 S.E.2d 766, 769 (W. Va. 1980).
12 Estate of Lindstrom, 236 Cal. Rptr. 376, 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Mass. Co. v. Evans,
924 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); In re Estate of Bennett, 789 P.2d 446, 447 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1989); Romaniello v. Romaniello, 760 So. 2d 1083, 1085 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000);
Barber v. Warren, 515 S.E.2d 153, 154 (Ga. 1999); Timberlake v. Munford, 481 S.E.2d 217,
218 (Ga. 1997); In re Estate of Brach, 498 N.E.2d 661, 662 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Blevins v.
Moran, 12 S.W.3d 698, 701 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000); In re Estate of Homburg, 697 So. 2d 1154,
1158 (Miss. 1997); In re Estate of Johnson, 615 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Neb. 2000); In re Estate of
Kinnamon, 837 P.2d 927, 929 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992); In re Estate of Janney, 446 A.2d 1265,
1266 (Pa. 1982); In re Walker, 849 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tenn. 1993); Cowden v. Sovran
Bank/Cent. S., 816 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tenn. 1991) ("cardinal and basic rule"); Frost Nat.'l Bank
of San Antonio v. Newton, 554 S.W.2d 149, 154 (Tex. 1977); Stickley v. Stickley, 497 S.E.2d
862, 864 (Va. 1998); Charleston Nat'l Bank, 507 S.E.2d at 713.
'3 Zirovcic v. Kordic, 709 P.2d 1022, 1023 (Nev. 1985); Early v. Bowen, 447 S.E.2d 167,
169 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); In re Estate of Flynn, 606 N.W.2d 104, 106 (N.D. 2000); Lourdes
Coll. of Sylvania, Ohio v. Bishop, 703 N.E.2d 362, 366 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1997); Janney, 446 A.2d
at 1266.
14 In re Estate of Hendrickson, 736 A.2d 540, 544 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1999).
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16ng,,,..... ling"15 "basic," "proper,"' 7 and even as "the cornerstone,"' 18 "the
touchstone,"' 9 or "the polestar" 20 driving their duty, regardless of the
unreasonableness or eccentricity of the will's terms.2' Whether they
call it interpretation, construction, or something else,22 most courts
agree that, in dealing with the contents of a will, the initial step is to
determine the testator's intent23 at the time the will was executed.
That determination employs the presumption that the testator knew
24the law in force at the time of such execution. After determining the
testator's intention, the court's duty is to carry out that intention
unless it is illegal, violates public policy, 25 or is unconstitution-
15 In re Estate of Snyder, 2 P.3d 238, 240 (Mont. 2000) ("The testator intent controls the
distribution of assets pursuant to a will."); Wright v. Brandon, 863 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Tenn.
1993); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1,
cmt. a (2003).
16 Daugherty v. Daugherty, 784 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tenn. 1990).
17 Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Wilbur, 728 N.E.2d 264, 270 (Mass. 2000).
18 Janney, 446 A.2d at 1266.
19 Lowrey v. McNeel, 773 So. 2d 449, 453 (Ala. 2000).
20 Tierce v. Gilliam, 652 So. 2d 254, 256 (Ala. 1994); In re Estate of Rogers, 473 N.W.2d
36, 39 (Iowa 1991); In re Estate of Redenius, 455 N.W.2d 295, 297 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990);
Hollenbeck v. Gray, 185 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Iowa 1971); Janney, 446 A.2d at 1266 ("lodestar");
In re Estate of Schultheis, 747 A.2d 918, 922 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); In re Estate of Smertz, 701
A.2d 268, 270 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); Hollowell v. Hollowell, 420 S.E.2d 827, 831 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1992) ("polar star").
21 See In re Estate of Campbell, 942 P.2d 1008, 1013 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
22 Unborn Beneficiaries of Kreigh Family Trust v. Kreigh, 554 N.E.2d 1167, 1168 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1990) ("[Tjhe court cannot 'interpret' an unambiguous trust or will; a court can con-
strue such a document to determine the testator's intent only if there is ambiguity in need of
interpretation.").
23 See San Antonio Area Found. v. Lang, 35 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex. 2000); Read v. Legg,
493 A.2d 1013, 1016 (D.C. 1985); Hobson v. Shelton, 302 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tex. Civ. App.
1957) ("The primary rule in the construction of wills is to ascertain and follow the intention of
the testator. All other rules of construction are of secondary importance, and are but auxiliaries
in the practical application of this cardinal rule.").
24 See Legare v. Legare, 490 S.E.2d 369, 371 (Ga. 1997); In re Estate of Lind, 734 N.E.2d
47, 50 (II. App. Ct. 2000); Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Wilbur, 728 N.E.2d 264, 267
(Mass. 2000); In re Estate of Flynn, 606 N.W.2d 104, 106 (N.D. 2000); Cent. Trust Co. of N.
Ohio v. Smith, 553 N.E.2d 265, 269-70 (Ohio 1990); In re Estate of Sneed, 953 P.2d 1111, 1115
(Okla. 1998); In re DiBiasio, 705 A.2d 972, 973-74 (R.I. 1998); Carmichael v. Heggie, 506
S.E.2d 308, 310 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998); In re Estate of Klauzer, 604 N.W.2d 474, 477 (S.D.
2000); Allen v. Talley, 949 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. App. 1997); In re Estate of Elmer, 959 P.2d
701, 703 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). But see Mitchell v. Mitchell, 244 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex. 1951)
("[W]here the meaning of the language used in the will has been settled by usage and sanctioned
by judicial decisions, it is presumed to be used in the sense that the law has given to it, and
should be so construed, unless the context of the will shows a clear intention to the contrary."
(quoting 69 CORPUS JURIS Wills § 1136 (1934))).
25 See Tierce, 652 So. 2d at 256; Wash. Hosp. Ctr. Health Sys. v. Riggs Nat'l Bank of
Wash., D.C., 575 A.2d 719, 721 (D.C. 1990); Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Beach, 513 N.E.2d
833, 834 (Il. 1987); In re Estate of Cline, 898 P.2d 643, 646 (Kan. 1995); Boston Safe Deposit
& Trust Co., 728 N.E.2d at 267; Boone County Nat'l Bank v. Edson, 760 S.W.2d 108, 111 (Mo.
1988); In re Estate of Ritter, 419 N.W.2d 521, 524 (Neb. 1988); Zirovcic v. Kordic, 709 P.2d
1022, 1023 (Nev. 1985); Stephenson v. Rowe, 338 S.E.2d 301, 304 (N.C. 1986); In re Estate of
Flowers, 848 P.2d 1146, 1152 (Okla. 1993); Schultheis, 747 A.2d at 923; Winningham v. Win-
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al.26 This governing framework continues to be vaunted in recent
will-interpretation jurisprudence as serving donative freedom, one of
the core values of Anglo-American property law.27
A. Plain Meaning
The plain-meaning rule states that where a testator's intention is
clear from the plain language of the document, there is no need to
admit extrinsic evidence or resort to rules of construction to advance
the interpretive process. 28 This rule has various justifications, includ-
ing the prevention of fraudulently proffered or unreliable evidence of
the testator's intent and the testator's own reliance that the rule will
be applied to his will.29 The plainness of the meaning is revealed by
"employ[ing] the generally accepted literal and grammatical meaning
of words used in the will, '30 and, "assum[ing] that the maker of the
will understood [the] words stated in the will,"'3' from any dominant
plan of distribution32 found within its four corners.33 Courts appear
ningham, 966 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Tenn. 1998); Turner v. Reed, 518 S.E.2d 832, 833 (Va. 1999);
Bowles v. Kinsey, 435 S.E.2d 129, 130 (Va. 1993); One Valley Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Hunt, 516
S.E.2d 519-20 (W. Va. 1999).
26 See In re Estate of Smith, 694 A.2d 1099, 1102 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); cf. REST-
ATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1, cmt. a (2003)
("[T]he donor's intention is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by law."); id. § 11.2
cmts. b, n, r. Note that effectuation of a testator's intention by judicial actors would not in itself
be unconstitutional; however, the chosen avenue for effectuation, for example, management of a
segregated park by state actors, might be. See also Shapira v. Union Nat'l Bank, 39 Ohio Misc.
28, 31-32, 315 N.E.2d 825, 827-828 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1974).
27 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. a (2003).
28 See Wilkins v. Garza, 693 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tex. App. 1985) (ruling it was no error for
the court to exclude evidence of circumstances existing when the will was executed when terms
of the will were unambiguous).
29 See Andrea W. Cornelison, Dead Man Talking: Are Courts Ready To Listen? The Ero-
sion of the Plain Meaning Rule, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 811, 815-16 (2001).
30 In re Estate of Walker, 402 N.W.2d 251,256 (Neb. 1987).
31 See In re Estate of Johnson, 615 N.W.2d 98, 99 (Neb. 2000).
32 See In re Paulsen's Estate, 158 P.2d 186, 191 (Colo. 1945) ("All subordinate provisions
bend in construction as the testator's main purpose ...."); In re Estate of Grimm, 705 N.E.2d
483, 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) ("[A] lawful general intent expressed in a will must be given
effect at the expense of any particular intent."); In re Young, 49 N.W.2d 769, 772 (Iowa 1951);
Strojek ex rel. Mills v. Hardin County Bd. of Supervisors, 602 N.W.2d 566, 571 (Iowa Ct. App.
1999) (remarking that the testator's intent must be determined from, among other things, "the
scheme for distribution"); In re Estate of McCabe, 703 N.Y.S.2d 559, 561 (N.Y. App. Div.
2000) ("If a reading of the will evinces a dominant plan of distribution, the various provisions
must be interpreted in light of that purpose .. "); Mansour v. Rabil, 177 S.E.2d 849, 858 (N.C.
1970); In re Walker's Estate, 101 A.2d 652, 655 (Pa. 1954); Elizabeth Higginson Weeden
Home for Indigent and Infirm Females v. Weeden's Heirs, 53 A.2d 476, 477 (R.I. 1947); In re
Will of Bybee, 896 S.W.2d 792, 793 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); Kling v. Va. Trust Co., 207 S.E.2d
890, 893 (Va. 1974); Berry v. Union Nat'l Bank, 262 S.E.2d 766, 769 (W. Va. 1980).
33 See Born v. Clark, 662 So. 2d 669, 671 (Ala. 1995) ("To determine the intent of a testa-
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especially comfortable taking a strict plain-meaning approach in cases
involving disputes over the meaning of technical legal terms in wills
drafted by attorneys.34 Such terms might include descriptions of the
quantum of estates and powers bequeathed to the beneficiaries. 35 Pro-
fessor Atkinson calls a rigid application of plain-meaning principles
"[s]trict construction," which "places emphasis upon the written
word, its usual and indeed its technical meaning."3  Strict construc-
tion focuses on plain meaning, rules of construction, precedent, and
the document's four corners.37
The plain-meaning rule has been the subject of considerable deri-
sion, with no less an authority than Professor Wigmore branding it a
fallacy: "In truth there can be only some person's meaning: and that
person, whose meaning the law is seeking, is the writer of the docu-
ment .... [Tihe 'plain meaning' is simply the meaning of the people
who did not write the document. Estates and trusts scholars, too,
have challenged the notion that wills ever contain plain language.
Any language, they claim, "is so colored by the circumstances sur-
rounding its formulation that evidence regarding the donor's intention
is always relevant.
' 39
tor or testatrix, the court must look to the four comers of the instrument. ); Henderson v.
Parker, 728 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Tex. 1987) ("[W]e must first look to the language used by the
testators within the four comers of the instrument."); Gaymon v. Gaymon, 519 S.E.2d 142, 144
(Va. 1999); Baron, supra note 7, at 638-39.
3 See In re Estate of Kime, 193 Cal. Rptr. 718, 728 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1983) ("Tech-
nical words are to be taken in their technical sense unless it satisfactorily appears that the will
was drawn solely by the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense.")
(internal quotation marks omitted); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 244 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex. 1951)
(noting that where a testator uses well-established legal terms in his will, particularly where an
attorney has drafted the will, the court must interpret the will in accordance with the meaning of
those terms, in the absence of a clear intention to the contrary); THOMAS E. ATKINSON,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 146, at 811 (2d ed. 1953) ("If the testator employed a
draftsman skilled in the use of technical words, these must be given their technical meaning.");
cf. Bergin v. Bergin, 315 S.W.2d 943, 946 ('ex. 1958) ("[A]s a layman rather than a lawyer,
[Mr. Bergin] cannot be deemed to have used words in the same technical sense that the words
might have if they were used by an attorney."); Sanderson v. First Nat'l Bank in Dallas, 446
S.W.2d 720, 725 (Tex. App. 1969) (noting that courts "'relax[] ... rules of construction ...
when the will is written by a layman' (quoting Huffman v. Huffman, 339 S.W.2d 885, 889
(Tex. 1960))).
35 See Mitchell, 244 S.W.2d at 806-07; Jones' Unknown Heirs v. Dorchester, 224 S.W.
596, 601 (Tex. App. 1920); cf. White v. Brown, 559 S.W.2d 938, 940-41 (Tenn. 1977) (employ-
ing rules of construction to help interpret holographic will ambiguous as to the quantum of
estate devised).
36 ATKINSON, supra note 34, at 808.
37 See id.
38 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2462, at 198 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1981), quoted in
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 413.
39 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.2
cmt. b (2003).
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Despite the lack of confidence some authorities bear toward the
plain-meaning rule, some helpful guideposts have developed to assist
courts in ascertaining plainness of meaning, at least when it comes to
wills. Justice Holmes, for example, posited that the quest for plain
meaning is not so much a quest for some meaning of words enshrined
and fixed for all time but something more flexible: "[W]hat those
words mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them
in the circumstances in which they were used .... [T]he normal
speaker of English is... our old friend the prudent [person] .... ."40
At first blush, Holmes' formulation does little to rebut Wigmore.
His invocation of the normal, prudent speaker of English raises prob-
lems concerning the elusive reasonable person that plague so many
areas of the law. But Holmes also emphasizes that the words must be
interpreted in the light of the circumstances in which they were used.
At the very least, this suggests that the plain-meaning rule, qua no-
extrinsic-evidence rule, does not exist, since the formulation itself
invites the admission of extrinsic evidence of the circumstances in
which the words were used in every case. At the very least, then, this
formulation swallows up the function of the plain-meaning rule,
which is to exclude extrinsic evidence.
The perplexing and contested nature of the plain-meaning rule is
perhaps the reason why the Restatement (Third) of Property rejects it
altogether as long discredited.4' Citing Wigmore, whose view was
that "words always need interpretation," it dubs the rule "archaic be-
cause it unduly stresses a supposed ordinary meaning of the words
employed. 4 2 As such, the Restatement holds that "[elxtrinsic evi-
dence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the donative
document... may always be considered. '43 The Reporter's Note adds
that such an approach, although seemingly in conflict with the plain-
meaning rule, is already well established.44
40 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L. REV. 417,
417-18 (1899), quoted in DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 414.
41 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 10.2
cmt. b, 12.1 cmt. d, reporter's note 5 (2003).
42 Id. § 10.2 cmt. b.
43 Id. § 10.2 cmt. d.
4 See id. § 10.2 reporter's note. Indeed, very few courts admit evidence of "all" the cir-
cumstances surrounding the execution of the will as a matter of course. See, e.g., In re Estate of
Russell, 444 P.2d 353, 360 (Cal. 1968) ("[W]e think it is self-evident that in the interpretation of
a will, a court cannot determine whether the terms of the will are clear and definite in the first
place until it considers the circumstances under which the will was made."); In re Estate of
McGahee, 550 So. 2d 83, 86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) ("Whether or not the will is ambiguous
on its face, the court is required to receive and consider evidence of the circumstances surround-
ing its execution in determining testamentary intent."); Legare v. Legate, 490 S.E.2d 369, 371
(Ga. 1997) ("'Proof of the situation and circumstances of a testator and his family, of his prop-
erty and legatees, and the like, is always admissible to aid in the construction of a will."' (quot-
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B. Extrinsic Evidence and Identifications
In spite of the discredit under which the plain-meaning rule has
fallen, it continues to have wide appeal in will construction matters.45
Starting less than a hundred years ago and continuing to the present
day, courts have remained steadfast against the admission of extrinsic
evidence, in particular evidence that would be used to contradict the
words of the will.46 However, if there is uncertainty about the testa-
tor's intentions after applying principles for the discovery of plain
meaning, extrinsic evidence4 7 of the circumstances existing when the
will was made48 (exclusive of the testator's direct oral declarations of
ing Watts v. Finley, I S.E.2d 723 (Ga. 1939))); Breckheimer v. Kraft, 273 N.E.2d 468, 470-71
(IlL. App. Ct. 1971).
45 See Cornelison, supra note 29, at 814 n.13 (collecting cases).
46 Aycock Pontiac, Inc. v. Aycock, 983 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Ark. 1998); In re Estate of
Weaver, 572 A.2d 1249, 1256 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Lehman v. Corpus Christi Nat'l Bank, 668
S.W.2d 687, 688 (Tex. 1984) ("The intent must be drawn from the will, not the will from the
intent." (quoting Huffman v. Huffman, 339 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Tex. 1960))); Odeneal v. Van
Horn, 678 S.W.2d 941, 942 (Tex. 1984) ("[W]hen the testator's intent is apparent on the face of
the will, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to show a contrary meaning."); Kirk v. Beard, 345
S.W.2d 267, 273 (Tex. 1961) ("No extrinsic testimony would be admissible to show an inten-
tion otherwise than as plainly expressed."); Wilkins v. Garza, 693 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tex. App.
1985) (ruling it was no error for the court to exclude evidence of circumstances existing when
the will was executed when terms of will were unambiguous); DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra
note 3, at 409-10 ("A plain meaning in a will cannot be disturbed by the introduction of extrin-
sic evidence that another meaning was intended.") (emphasis added); Comelison, supra note 29,
at 817 n.27 (collecting cases).
47 See Patch v. White, 117 U.S. 210, 217 (1886); Read v. Legg, 493 A.2d 1013, 1016-17
(D.C. 1985) ("Only if the intent of the testator cannot be discerned from the four comers of the
will may the court examine extrinsic evidence to determine intent."); In re Estate of Romero,
847 P.2d 319, 322 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) ("Where the intent of a testator is not crystal clear from
the will itself, the scheme of distribution, circumstances surrounding the testator, and other
existing facts should be a subject of judicial inquiry."); In re Estate of McCabe, 703 N.Y.S.2d
559, 561 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) ("If... a provision of the will is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence
is properly considered in discerning the testator's true intent.").
48 See In re Estate of Pouser, 975 P.2d 704, 708 (Ariz. 1999); Bennett v. Young, 510
S.E.2d 521, 522 (Ga. 1999); In re Estate of Thompson, 511 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Iowa 1994); In re
Trust of Killian, 459 N.W.2d 497, 499 (Iowa 1991) ("That intent is to be determined from the
language of the instrument, the scheme of distribution, and the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the document's execution."); Succession of Williams, 608 So. 2d 973, 975 (La. 1992);
Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Wilbur, 728 N.E.2d 264, 267 (Mass. 2000); Shawmut Bank,
N.A. v. Buckley, 665 N.E.2d 29, 34 (Mass. 1996); Pruss v. Pruss, 514 N.W.2d 335, 344 (Neb.
1994); In re Estate of Branigan, 609 A.2d 431, 436 (N.J. 1992); In re Bieley, 695 N.E.2d 1119,
1122 (N.Y. 1998); In re Estate of Neshem, 574 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1998); Cent. Trust Co. of N.
Ohio v. Smith, 553 N.E.2d 265, 269 (Ohio 1990); Estate of Rosenberg v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare,
679 A.2d 767, 772 n.3 (Pa. 1996) ("Only when intent is not clear will a court consider external
matters, and then only matters closely related to the execution of the document."); Wright v.
Brandon, 863 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Tenn. 1993); Haag v. Stickley, 389 S.E.2d 691,694 (Va. 1990).
"The most important of these 'surrounding circumstances' are 'the recipients of testator's
bounty, their relations to him and associations with him, his uniform affection for them, or any
interruption thereof."' Legare v. Legare, 490 S.E.2d 369, 371 (Ga. 1997) (quoting Olmstead v.
Dunn, 72 Ga. 850(l)(b) (1884)); see also Cent. Carolina Bank & Trust Co. v. Wright, 478
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intent),4 may be admitted and no resort had to rules of construction.5 °
Atkinson describes this approach as "liberal construction," which
emphasizes the testator's intention and the extrinsic evidence required
to reveal it.51 Liberal construction shuns rules of construction and
precedent, declaring that no will is like any other and should be
evaluated in the light of surrounding circumstances. 52 Such circum-
stances might include the donor's occupation, the property she owned
at the time she executed her will, and the relationships she had with
her family or others.53 In the words of one court, "[it is only where
S.E.2d 33, 37 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) ("The 'circumstances attendant' include 'the relationships
between the testator and the beneficiaries named in the will, and the condition, nature and extent
of the testator's property."' (quoting Pittman v. Thomas, 299 S.E.2d 207, 211 (N.C. 1983))).
49 See In re Estate of Snyder, 2 P.3d 238, 240 (Mont. 2000). This seems to be a concern
about the Dead Man's statute, dealt with in diverse ways by different states. See, e.g., In re
Estate of Fabian, 483 S.E.2d 474, 477 n.2 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) ("Because this issue will come
up again on retrial, the trial court may wish to consider the following principles in determining
which testimony is or is not admissible under the Dead Man's Statute."). Dukeminier and Jo-
hanson assert that direct expressions of intent are admissible to resolve equivocations and that
oral declarations made to the scrivener are generally admissible in all cases of latent ambiguity.
See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 426.
50 See Newman v. Wells Fargo Bank, 926 P.2d 969, 973 (Cal. 1996) ("Only if the terms
are ambiguous will the court resort to presumptions which create a legal presumption of in-
tent."); In re Trust of Killian, 459 N.W.2d 497, 499 (Iowa 1991) ("Courts should resort to
technical rules of construction only if ambiguous language in the will or trust creates uncertainty
about the maker's intent."); In re Estate of Cline, 898 P.2d 643, 646 (Kan. 1995) (noting resort
is not necessary to either extrinsic evidence or to rules of construction when intention is clear on
document's face); Estate of Straube v. Barber, 990 S.W.2d 40, 44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); Watson
v. Smoker, 530 S.E.2d 344, 346 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000); Pittman v. Thomas, 299 S.E.2d 207, 211
(N.C. 1983); In re DiBiasio, 705 A.2d 972, 973-74 (R.I. 1998); Allison v. Wilson, 411 S.E.2d
433, 435 (S.C. 1991); McGill v. Johnson, 799 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Tex. 1990) ("If the language
used is not free from doubt or ambiguity, then canons of construction may be resorted to ....");
Shriner's Hosp. for Crippled Children of Tex. v. Stahl, 610 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Tex. 1980) ("All
rules of construction must yield to the basic intention and purpose of the testator as reflected by
the entire instrument."); Frost Nat'l Bank of San Antonio v. Newton, 554 S.W.2d 149, 153
(Tex. 1977) ("No speculation or conjecture regarding the intent of the testatrix is permissible
where, as here, the will is unambiguous, and we must construe the will based on the express
language used therein."); Wilkins v. Garza, 693 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tex. App. 1985) ("If the
words used by the testator are clear and unambiguous, construction of the will is unnecessary
. ...."); Sanderson v. First Nat'l Bank in Dallas, 446 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Tex. App. 1969); Hobson
v. Shelton, 302 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tex. App. 1957) ("The primary rule in the construction of
wills is to ascertain and follow the intention of the testator. All other rules of construction are of
secondary importance, and are but auxiliaries in the practical application of this cardinal rule.").
But see In re Estate of Grulke, 546 N.W.2d 626, 628 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (stating that if a
simple reading of the will "does not unmistakably reveal the maker's intention, the court may
resort to certain accredited canons of construction").
At least one court does not define determining the testator's intent from the plain language
of the document as an act of interpretation. See In re Succession of Czindula, 751 So. 2d 986,
989 (La. Ct. App. 2000) ("If the terms of a will are clear and unambiguous, no interpretation is
needed to ascertain the testator's intent.").
51 See ATKINSON, supra note 34, at 808.
52 See id.
53 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
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testamentary language is not clear in its application to facts that evi-
dence may be introduced as to the circumstances under which the
testator used that language in order to throw light upon its mean-
ing.",54 Such lack of clarity is commonly referred to as latent ambigu-
ity,55 latency referring, of course, to the fact that the ambiguity "is not
apparent on the face of the will but is disclosed by some fact collat-
eral to it,"'56 and ambiguity referring to "more than one reasonable
interpretation." 57 Although "direct evidence of intention contradicting
the plain meaning of the text does not establish a latent ambiguity,,
58
if the ambiguity consists of the lack of clarity described above, extrin-
sic evidence may be introduced to resolve it.59
The foregoing articulation of the rule of extrinsic evidence is eas-
ier to describe than to apply. As a practical matter, there are several
instances in which courts routinely admit extrinsic evidence even
when the language of a will is plain. Extrinsic evidence is admissible,
for example, to show that the will was executed without the required
testamentary intent, as in cases of sham wills. 6° Another simple ex-
ample, relevant to the current discussion, is the necessity of making
identifications in all wills cases. Evidence scholar John Wigmore
himself once asserted that the words in documents always need inter-
pretation, if only because a court cannot realistically carry out their
expressed intent until it considers extrinsic evidence allowing it to
make connections between the words and the actual persons and
property to which they refer. As a challenge to the notion that there is
§ 10.2 cmt. d (2003).
5 Mahoney v. Grainger, 186 N.E. 86, 87 (Mass. 1933) (emphasis added), quoted in
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 411.
55 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11. 1
(2003) ("An ambiguity in a donative document is an uncertainty in meaning .... ");
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 421, 424-25. For examples of the use of extrinsic
evidence to reveal and resolve ambiguous descriptions of persons or property, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.2 cmts. i-j,
illus. 2-9 (2003).
56 DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 420-21; see also In re Estate of Schultheis,
747 A.2d 918, 923 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) ("'A latent ambiguity arises from collateral facts which
make the meaning of a written [document] uncertain, although the language appears clear on the
face of the [document]."' (quoting Krizovensky v. Krizovensky, 624 A.2d 638, 643 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1993))).
57 In re Estate of Brown, 559 N.W.2d 818, 822 (N.D. 1997).
58 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1 1.1
cmt. c (2003) (emphasis omitted).
59 See Schultheis, 747 A.2d at 923 ("Where a latent ambiguity exists, the court may resort
to parol evidence (such as testimony of the scrivener) to determine the decedent's true intent.").
60 See G. Sidney Buchanan, No Connecticut Yankee in the Texas Supreme Court, 40
HOuLS. L. REV. 931, 941 (2003) (discussing Fleming v. Morrison, 72 N.E. 499 (Mass. 1904));
see also In re Estate of Smelser, 818 P.2d 822, 827 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting provision of
will not reflective of testamentary intent).
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any such thing as plain language, this theory is not particularly diffi-
cult to accept. As applied to wills, it simply means that extrinsic evi-
dence of intention must always be admitted in probate cases because
some linkage between the words on the page as symbols of the ob-
jects to which they refer and the objects themselves must be made.
Since making connections between the symbols on the page and the
property and beneficiaries to which those symbols refer lies at the
very heart of carrying out a testator's duly executed estate plan, no
great harm should arise from understanding extrinsic evidence to be
essential in any process of identification. Nevertheless, Professor
Thayer saw it a little differently, characterizing identifications as "the
fatal necessity of looking outside the text [that] tends to steadily de-
stroy" the illusion of a "fixed, precisely ascertained meaning.
61
Thayer may simply have been referring to the fact that much can go
wrong in the process of making identifications, but more than likely
he was illustrating the truth of Wigmore's assertion that language
always requires interpretation. To carry out the directions, even of a
text remarkable for its plainness of meaning, then, requires identifica-
tions to be made that tend to undermine the view that the plain-
meaning rule is altogether hostile to extrinsic evidence. Under tradi-
tional law, for the purposes of making identifications of persons and
property, extrinsic evidence has had and continues to have a signifi-
cant role to play.
Just as extrinsic evidence is required to make identifications, it is
also required where identifications fail in so-called equivocation and
personal usage cases. Equivocation is a species of latent ambiguity
that occurs "where a description fits two or more external objects
equally well," as where a testator bequeaths property "'to my niece
Alicia,"' but has two nieces named Alicia. 62 Identification problems
arise where a testator's habit to refer to a person or property in an
idiosyncratic manner63 or in a way divergent from the ordinary mean-
ing of the reference64 carries over into his will. He may have for ex-
ample, used terms, such as "family" or "money," that today lack any
65fixed legal meaning. He may have referred to his car as a cart,
61 THAYER, supra note 1, at 428-29, quoted in DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at
413.
62 DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 426; see also Buchanan, supra note 60, at
943 (two nieces named Jane). For this reason, equivocations also have been called "pure" ambi-
guities. See, e.g., id.
63 DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 413.
64 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.2
cmt. r (2003); see also id. § 11.2 cmt. t. For examples of the use of extrinsic evidence of per-
sonal usage to reveal and resolve ambiguities, see id. § 11.2 cmts. t-u, illus. 21-25.
65 See, e.g., Paul v. Ball, 31 Tex. 10, 10 (Tex. 1868) (meaning of "money" and "family").
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buggy, or bucket. In such cases, extrinsic evidence may be used to
show that the testator always referred to the person or object in that
peculiar way66 or to clarify "the subjects and the objects intended to
be embraced in the disposition of his property by the testator. ' '67 Some
are comfortable grouping matters of equivocation with other latent
ambiguities and personal usage cases in the more general but distinct
category of mistaken descriptions.68 I, however, prefer to treat both
equivocation and personal usage cases as matters pertaining to identi-
fication specifically, given the readiness with which courts admit ex-
trinsic evidence in both types of cases. In personal usage cases in par-
ticular, there is no sense that the testator has made a mistake. The
extrinsic evidence required is only that which is sufficient to show
what the words meant to the testator 69 and, as such, conforms favora-
bly to Justice Holmes's admonition that, in construing a will, the task
of a court is to determine not what a testator meant but failed to say
but, rather, to determine what he has said.7 °
Problems in identification may also arise in cases of misdescrip-
tion, also referred to as mistaken description.1 Indeed, ambiguous
description is said to be the "prototype" of all latent ambiguities.72
This statement is reflective of the large degree of overlap between
problems relating to identification and latent ambiguities generally.
The Restatement itself equates latent ambiguities in large measure
with identification problems arising from misdescriptions and per-
sonal usage and provides copious illustrations of these.73
Even the term "child" might be considered vague today, but it was not always so. See THAYER,
supra note 1, at 448-49 ("Facts tending very strongly to show that the testator meant to include
illegitimate children are generally irrelevant, because, prima facie, the legal definition of the
term children excludes illegitimates, and therefore a contrary interpretation is not in general
legally allowable.").
66 DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 413 (idiosyncratic reference to a person)
(citing Moseley v. Goodman, 195 S.W. 590 (Tenn. 1917)); Buchanan, supra note 60, at 947
(idiosyncratic reference to a chattel).
67 Paul v. Ball, 31 Tex. 10, 13 (Tex. 1868).
68 See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 60, at 944, 947.
69 Id. at 947.
70 See Holmes, supra note 40, at 418; accord Shriner's Hospital for Crippled Children of
Tex. v. Stahl, 610 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Tex. 1980); Kirk v. Beard, 345 S.W.2d 267, 273 (Tex.
1961) ("The question is not what the testator intended to write but what is the meaning of the
words he actually used."); White v. Taylor, 286 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex. 1956); Kokernot v.
Deman, 708 S.W.2d 921, 924 (Tex. Civ. App. 1986) ("The question is not what the testator
intended to write, but the meaning of the words she actually used.").
71 DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 437.
72 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATWE TRANSFERS § 11.1
cmt. c (2003).
73 See id. §§ 11.1 cmt. c, 11.2 cmt. h, illus. 2-9 (2003).
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Misdescription cases, unlike cases of personal usage or pure ambi-
guity, arise when the testator has actually committed an oversight
making identification impossible or somehow erroneous. The classic
case in this vein is Patch v. White,74 in which the owner of lot number
3 in square 406 bequeathed "lot number 6 in square 403." 75 Although
identification was not rendered impossible by the oversight,76 the fact
that the testator did not own the property he described rendered his
will powerless to bequeath it to anyone. The misdescription in Patch,
then, is less like an ambiguity77 than it is an outright mistake, and as a
general matter, courts refuse to correct mistakes in wills. 78 Neverthe-
less, misdescriptions fall under the maxim of falsa demonstration non
nocet (a false description causes no harm),79 an exception to the mis-
808take rule. A court may simply strike the erroneous language.8' In
Patch, this meant that the "lot" that extrinsic evidence revealed the
testator owned and intended to devise through his will passed to the
intended beneficiary.82
A trickier case of misdescription arose in Breckheimer v. Kraft.8 3
In that case, the testator bequeathed property to her nephew Raymond
,,84
and "Mabel Schneikert his wife, of Plymouth, Wisconsin. At the
time the will was executed, Raymond was divorced from Mabel and
had married Evelyn.8 5 Mabel had moved away from Plymouth.
86
Unlike in Patch, identification failed altogether because no one satis-
factorily met the description in the will. 87 Extrinsic evidence of sur-
74 117 U.S. 210 (1886).
75 Id. at 213.
76 Id. at 215 (stating that the testator did not own lot 6 in square 403 and that there were no
improvements on that lot).
77 See id. at 218 ('"In these cases the substance of the subject intended is certain, and if
there is but one such substance, the superadded description, though false, introduces no ambigu-
ity....' (quoting SIR JAMES WIGRAM, WIGRAM ON EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE 53 (1853))). But see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.2 cmt. j, illus.
6 (2003) (reasoning that "evidence that the donor did not own the described property... usually
suffices to prove that the text ambiguously describes the intended property").
78 DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 173, 437. For a proposal to modernize the
law of reformation and modification of wills on the ground of mistake, see John H. Langbein &
Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction
in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521 (1982).
79 Author's translation; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 635, 1073, 1076 (8th ed.
2004) (defining "falsa demonstratio" as "[a] false designation," "non" as a term that "negates,"
and "nocent" as "[i]njurious" or "harmful").
10 DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 437.
81 Id. For a list of cases applying this doctrine, see In re Estate of Goldstein, 363 N.Y.S.2d
147, 150 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), afftd, 382 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1976).
92 See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 427.
13 273 N.E.2d 468 (I1. App. Ct. 1971).
84 Id. at 469.
85 See id.
96 See id.
97 See id.
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rounding circumstances tended to show that the testator had misde-
scribed Evelyn.88 Ignoring "Mabel" was all that was needed to effec-
tuate the intended bequest.8
9
It bears noting here that Breckheimer did not involve a scrivener's
error. The testator there, simply directed the attorney to draft her will
according to the terms she herself provided.90 The attorney was unac-
quainted with the details of the testator's personal circumstances. 9'
Apart from the exceptions to the plain-meaning rule discussed above,
scriveners' mistakes in drafting have inspired little sympathy in the
courts.92 This is particularly true in disputes over the meaning of
93technical legal terms in wills drafted by attorneys. Mahoney v.
Grainger94 and San Antonio Area Foundation v. Lang95 are examples.
In Mahoney, the testator directed her attorney to draft a will bequeath-
ing her residual estate to her first cousins.9 6 The attorney read the will
to the testator, and she executed it, but the will as drafted bequeathed
the residuary to the testator's "heirs at law, 97 who as a legal matter
were her aunt and not her first cousins.98 Given the lack of ambiguity
in the will, the fact that the drafter made an error in carrying out the
testator's instructions was of no consequence.99 Had the testator "ha-
bitually referred to her twenty-five first cousins as her 'heirs,"' the
case might have qualified for the personal-usage exception.'t°
In San Antonio Area Foundation v. Lang, the testator devised her
"real property" to her niece and nephew Lang and the residuary of her
88 See id. at 471.
89 See id.; see also Cornelison, supra note 29, at 824 (suggesting a similar result when a
will listed a "nonexistent address").
90 See Breckheimer, 273 N.E.2d at 470.
91 See id.
92 See DUKEMIN1ER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 427-38 (describing cases where scriv-
eners' errors resulted in patent ambiguity); see also Scarlett v. Hopper, 823 P.2d 435, 437 (Or.
Ct. App. 1992) (refusing reformation of will).
93 See In re Estate of Kime, 193 Cal. Rptr. 718, 728 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1983) ("Tech-
nical words are to be taken in their technical sense unless it satisfactorily appears that the will
was drawn solely by the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense.")
(internal quotation marks omitted); Bergin v. Bergin, 315 S.W.2d 943, 946 (Tex. 1958) ("[A]s a
layman rather than a lawyer, [Mr. Bergin] cannot be deemed to have used words in the same
technical sense that the words might have if they were used by an attorney."); Sanderson v. First
Nat'l Bank in Dallas, 446 S.W.2d 720, 725 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (noting that courts relax rules
of construction "when the will is written by a layman" (quoting Huffman v. Huffman, 339
S.W.2d 885, 889 (1960))).
94 186 N.E. 86 (Mass. 1933).
95 35 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. 2000).
96 Mahoney, 186 N.E. at 86.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
I°°RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.2
illus. 23 (2003).
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estate to a charity.1 ' At some point between the execution of her will
and her death, some of the testator's real property, originally part of a
large family-owned tract, was sold and became the subject of cash
and promissory notes still held by her at her death. 10 2 The Langs
claimed that the testator meant "real property" to include the cash and
promissory notes because she considered all of that property to be
part of a single real estate development scheme from which she
wished the Langs to benefit.10 3 Noting the well-established legal
meaning of "real property," 4 the Supreme Court of Texas rejected
the Langs' proffered extrinsic evidence and held that the cash and
promissory notes passed to the charity under the residuary clause of
the will. 10 5 Although the result may have been different had the testa-
tor drafted her own will,' °6 the presence of a scrivener in the will exe-
cution process made it unlikely that the testator had herself inserted a
new and altogether unfamiliar definition of "real property" in her last
will and testament.10 7
C. Resorting to Construction When Interpretation Fails
Most courts call the basic principles I have outlined above-
"discovering the meaning or the intention of the testator from permis-
sible data"l 8 -the process of will interpretation. This approach paral-
lels the standard approach to statutory interpretation wherein courts
must presume a statute means what it says and ignore secondary
markers of legislative intent unless the statutory language is ambigu-
ous."°9 As such, it is a familiar method of interpretation. What is less
well known is what a court must do when even the admission of ex-
trinsic evidence is insufficient to disclose the testator's actual intent.
At this juncture, the court will resort to will construction," l0 the proc-
ess of attributing intention to the words used by the testator with the
101 35 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 2000).
102/d.
103 Id. at 639.
14Id. at 640, 641.
105 Id. at 642.
106See, e.g., In re Estate of Kime, 193 Cal. Rptr. 718 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1983).
107See Comelison, supra note 29, at 825 (opining that contemporary practices in estate
planning may have eliminated personal usage problems). But see Buchanan, supra note 60, at
960 (suggesting that the will in San Antonio Area Foundation contained "testator code").
108 ATKINSON, supra note 34, at 809.
"09 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1995); Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modem Parol Evidence Rule and Its Implications
for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195, 208-12 (1998).
"1 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3
cmt. c (2003) ("The process of interpretation is sometimes thought to occur first, followed by
construction only when interpretation fails.").
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aid of rules of construction and constructional preferences.1" By re-
sorting to construction, a court is essentially declaring the testator's
intent itself to be ambiguous. The application of rules of construction,
then, is calculated to endow the conveyance with some legal effect,
albeit in favor of imputing an intent as the state identifies it. 112
Rules of construction are highly specific, rebuttable presumptions
that dictate the meaning of particular terms in the will or the applica-
tion of those terms to well-defined factual scenarios, and they deter-
mine "the construction which the Courts are bound, in the absence of
a sufficiently declared intention to the contrary, to put upon particular
words, expressions, and forms of disposition occurring in wills."1 3
Any rule of construction has the effect of presuming that certain
words or expressions shall mean X rather than y.114 Such rules act
externally on the will to disclose, as Justice Holmes put it, "not what
this man meant, but what those words would mean in the mouth of a
normal speaker of English."'1 5 Rules of law, on the other hand act
independently of intention and are not rules of construction."t 6 Some
examples of rules of law, as opposed to rules of construction, are "the
rule in Shelley's Case, the rules as to perpetuity, mortmain, lapse,
&c. '' 117 Use of the rules of construction often arises in the wills con-
text in cases involving the effect of conditions, revocation by subse-
quent instruments, ademption, 1 8 abatement, election, exoneration,
I Allen v. Shea, 665 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Idaho 1983) (stating that rules of construction are
not used unless testator's intent is unclear); Hintze v. Black, 873 P.2d 909, 912 (Idaho Ct. App.
1994) ("In the absence of extrinsic evidence of intent, the court may apply rules of construction
to interpret the instrument."); Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Beach, 513 N.E.2d 833, 834 (III.
1987); In re Estate of Grimm, 705 N.E.2d 483, 496 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); In re Estate of Grulke,
546 N.W.2d 626, 628 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) ("[C]anons of construction permit us to impute a
meaning conforming to the testator's probable intention and one that is most agreeable to reason
and justice."); B. M. C. Durfee Trust Co. v. Franzheim, 207 N.E.2d 913, 916 (Mass. 1965);
Straube v. Barber, 990 S.W.2d 40, 44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); Pittman v. Thomas, 299 S.E.2d 207,
211 (N.C. 1983); Watson v. Smoker, 530 S.E.2d 344, 346 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000); In re Estate of
Weaver, 572 A.2d 1249, 1256 (Pa. Super. 1990); In re Estate of Klauzer, 604 N.W.2d 474, 477
(S.D. 2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 11.3 cmt. c (2003) ("'Construction' refers to the process of attributing intention from con-
structional preferences and rules of construction.").
12 See Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L. REV. 611, 612
(1988).
13 FRANCIS VAUGHAN HAWKINS, A CONCISE TREATISE ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS
vii (1885).
1141d.
115 Holmes, supra note 40, at 417-18.
116 Id. Although it is a rule of construction, the rule of convenience, closing a class "when-
ever any member of the class is entitled to possession and enjoyment of his or her share," has
been described as closer to an unbending rule of law than any other rule of construction.
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 778.
7 HAWKINS, supra note 113, at vii.
118 In Wasserman v. Cohen, 606 N.E.2d 901 (Mass. 1993), the court suggested that
ademption cases do not require use of rules of construction given that the focus in such cases "is
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lapse, and future interests. An example of a rule of construction is as
follows: where the heirs of X are given a remainder interest in prop-
erty, the identity of those heirs must be determined as of the date of
death of X and not as of the date of death of the holder of the previous
estate." 9
Constructional preferences, by contrast, are very general, rebut-
table presumptions that merely guide the court toward the resolution
of an ambiguity. 20 An example of a constructional preference is the
preference for resolving ambiguities in a will in favor of family mem-
bers over nonfamily members. 21 Both rules of construction and con-
structional preferences contribute uniformity and predictability to the
law of wills, but of course, as rebuttable presumptions, they yield to
evidence of a testator' s contrary intention.
II. THE DISAPPEARING DISTINCTION BETWEEN
INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
Most courts hew to the view that the plain-meaning rule applies to
the interpretation of unambiguous wills. This begs the question, of
course, of how a court should arrive at the conclusion that a will is
unambiguous. The trouble for some courts may lie in a lack of under-
standing of the distinction between interpretation and construction.
Wills scholar Thomas Atkinson defines interpretation as "discovering
the meaning or the intention of the testator from permissible data."'
' 22
By contrast, construction signifies "assigning meaning to the instru-
ment when the testator's intention cannot be fully ascertained from
proper sources."' 123 Seen in this light, construction is necessary only
when interpretation fails.'
24
At present, the law of most states makes a clear distinction be-
tween will interpretation and will construction. There does, however,
seem to be some dispute about when the process of interpretation
on the actual existence or nonexistence of the bequeathed property, and not on the intent of the
testator."
19 See In re Woodworth, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 676 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), reprinted in
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 768,769.
12
0 
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3
cmt. b (2003).
121 See id. § 11.3(c)(3).
122 ATKINSON, supra note 34, at 809.
1
23 Id. at 809-10. At least one court defines determining the testator's intent from the plain
language of the document as not an act of interpretation. See In re Czindula, 751 So. 2d 986,
989 (La. Ct. App. 2000) ("If the terms of a will are clear and unambiguous, no interpretation is
needed to ascertain the testator's intent.").
1
24 See ATKINSON, supra note 34, at 810.
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actually begins. To the extent that plain language is permissible data,
Professor Atkinson would hold that interpretation begins as soon as a
probate court begins to analyze the language of a will in search of the
testator's actual intent and that construction is necessary only when
this quest fails. Other scholars describe interpretation as not com-
mencing until the plain-meaning approach has failed.1 25
The ALI, however, has decided that will interpretation and will
construction are not discrete parts of a sequential process but are, in
fact, simply components of a single process known as construction. 126
The ALI dispenses with the term interpretation in favor of the term
construction and suggests that "interpretation" be limited to refer-
ences to the construction of contracts. 2 7 Henceforth, courts will con-
sider actual intention (interpretation) and presumed intention (con-
struction) simultaneously. 128 This approach to construction will result
in "the final product of the process of determining the meaning of a
donative document."'
129
The ALI justifies its rejection of the well-established distinction
between the interpretation and construction-a distinction embodied
not only in the Restatement of Property but also in the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts of Laws' 3°--by claiming that courts analyzing
wills already analyze actual and presumed intention simultane-
ously. 131 But the examples given for that claim are examples of the
judicial practice of resorting to rules of construction and construc-
tional preferences in cases where there is some evidence of actual
intention, but that evidence is not "sufficiently persuasive."' 132 Such
cases do not reinforce departure from the sequential process that is so
familiar in the wills context. The ALI's own justification for blurring
125 See, e.g., Hawkins, supra note 1, at 577, 578,584, 585.
126 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3
cmt. c (2003) ("Interpretation and construction are not completely distinct processes... nor are
they applied sequentially. Interpretation and construction are part of a single process.");
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 241(2) (1950) (referring to construction as a process), quoted
in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3 re-
porter's note 1 (2003).
127 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3
reporter's note 1 (2003).
128 See id. § 11.3 cmt. c.
129 1d. § 10.1 cmt. b.
130 See id. § 11.3 reporter's note I (stating that the first Restatement "misdescribe[d] the
process").
131 See id. § 11.3 cmt. c ("[T]he process of construction requires all factors to be brought to
bear simultaneously and conflicting factors to be considered against each other. This is a single
process .... [T]he constructional preference or rule of construction is considered together with
any evidence of actual intention.").
132 See id., § 11.3 cmt. c ("It would misdescribe the process to say that the constructional
preference or rule of construction ought to be consulted only if there is no evidence of actual
intention.").
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the distinction, then, actually supports recognition, not rejection, of
the distinction, because it emphasizes that courts should resort to rules
of construction only when they have found sufficient evidence of
actual intent wanting. This clear principle continues to be expressly
recognized in recent state supreme court cases. Moreover, the ALl
itself adheres to the view that "[a]ctual intention, when sufficiently
established, always overcomes attributed intention.
133
It is unclear why the ALI rejects the traditional two-step
interpretive process. One reason may be the Restatement's
exceedingly general definition of interpretation and construction as
nothing more than tools for the ascertainment of the meaning of
language. Given the imprecision of this definition, and its lack of any
account of the different objectives of interpretation and
construction, 134  it is understandable why the Restatement would
characterize judicial analysis of wills as much less methodical than is
suggested by Atkinson's description of a structured, sequential
process. Finally, the Restatement itself appears to resist the ALI's
attempted erasure of the interpretation-construction distinction, given
the numerous statements it contains that conflict with the notion of a
single-step interpretive process.135 The following case discussion is
meant to serve as an illustration of the danger of blurring the line
between interpretation and construction.
133 Id. (emphasis added).
134 See id. (." [linterpretation' refers to the process of searching for the donor's actual inten-
tion by looking to the text of the document and extrinsic evidence. 'Construction' refers to the
process of attributing intention from constructional preferences and rules of construction.").
135 See, e.g., id. § 11.2 cmt. b (2003) ("To the extent that the donor's intention is not estab-
lished by a preponderance of the evidence [even after admitting extrinsic evidence], techniques
of construction may be applied to give effect to intention to the extent possible."); Id. § 11.2
cmt. f (noting the resort to constructional preferences or rules of construction in cases where
extrinsic evidence does not resolve ambiguity); Id. § 11.2 cmt. j, illus. 6 (noting that without
extrinsic evidence of intention, one may resort to constructional preferences); Id. § 11.2 cmt. k
("[l1n rare cases of ambiguity, the evidence does not adequately establish the donor's intention
by a preponderance of the evidence. If a constructional preference or a rule of construction
applies to the ambiguity, the ambiguity is resolved by the constructional preference or rule of
construction."); Id. § 11.3 cmt. e ("When relevant, a rule of construction or a constructional
preference assists the trier of fact in ascertaining the particular donor's intention in circum-
stances in which evidence of actual intention is inadequate or altogether missing."). Even the
Restatement's demonstration of a benign use of constructional preferences to "reinforce[] evi-
dence of [actual] intention" suggests a two-tiered interpretive process. Id. § 11.2 cmt. a; see also
id. § 11.2 cmt. j, illus. 6 (noting that a constructional preference may support an outcome al-
ready reached by way of the admission of extrinsic evidence).
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III. STEGER V. MUENSTER DRILLING Co. 13
6
A. Facts
John and Carrie Maddox owned vast quantities of oil-rich land in
Texas and held it as their community property. 137 John leased some of
the land for the purposes of oil production in the 1920s, but at his
death in 1933, the land was only just beginning to be exploited.'38 The
standard oil lease at the time conveyed to the lessee a fee simple de-
terminable in the mineral estate, thereby allowing the lessee to retain
the fee simple as long as oil was produced in paying quantities.139
The Maddoxes had ten children. 14° When he died, John devised his
one-half of the community interest to his wife for life followed by
remainders for life to his ten children and successive remainders in
fee to his children's children.'14 If any of his children died childless,
John provided that the remainder in fee would be distributed among
the children of John and Carrie surviving at the time of distribution. 142
In addition to her life estate, John gave Carrie the following powers
and authority: (1) full power and authority to manage, control, and
lease for all purposes the real and personal property given during her
lifetime; (2) full power and authority to extract therefrom all oil, gas,
and other minerals during her lifetime; and (3) full power and author-
ity to collect and have the rents and revenues during her life. 143 In
addition to her remainder in a life estate in four specific parcels, 144
John gave to his daughter Martha Lou Hughes the power to "make
leases of whatever nature . ..and to extract therefrom all oil, gas
and/or other minerals ... during.., her lifetime."'' 41
After her husband's death, Carrie executed two oil and gas leases
(Maddox ## 2 and 3) in favor of Martha Lou's husband, Dan.146 Each
was in the standard form and covered one of the tracts in which Mar-
tha Lou held her remainder for life under the will of her father. 147
Upon her own death, Carrie devised to Martha Lou her entire interest
136 134 S.W.3d 359 (Tex. App. 2003).
137See id. at 363.
131 See id. at 364.
139See id. at 365.
140See id. at 364.
41 See id. at 364 n.2.
142 See Will of John W. Maddox, U 6, 8, 9 (May 17, 1933) (on file with author).
143 See Steger, 134 S.W.3d at 364 n.2 (reproducing Will of John W. Maddox, supra note
142, 6).
144See id. at 365 & n.3 (reproducing Will of John W. Maddox, supra note 142, 19).
145 See id. at 365 n.3 (reproducing Will of John W. Maddox, supra note 142, 8).
146 See id. at 365.
147 See id. at 365-66.
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in the same tracts to which John had given Martha Lou a remainder in
a life estate.148 This included both the surface rights and mineral
rights to the tracts in question, with the stipulation that other family
members would receive a share of bonuses and royalties arising from
the production of oil, gas, and other minerals. 149 After Carrie's death,
Martha Lou, in 1977, executed an oil and gas lease, employing fee
simple determinable language, in favor of Dan (Maddox # 4), cover-
ing a tract as to half of which she was a tenant for life under the will
of John and the other half of which she owned outright under the will
of Carrie. 150 This lease had a primary term of twenty years and "as
long thereafter as oil and/or gas is produced in paying quantities."'
15
'
When Dan died, he devised his interest in the Maddox ## 2, 3, and
4 leases he had procured from Carrie and from Martha Lou to Martha
Lou. 152 Martha Lou continued to operate the wells Dan had opened.
Martha Lou died on May 7, 1993, terminating her life estate in the
four tracts she had inherited from John. 15 3 Since she died without is-
sue, the tracts she had inherited from her father became vested in fee
in her sister Marjorie Maddox Steger, John's sole surviving child.'
54
In her will, Martha Lou devised "all of the oil, gas, and mineral inter-
ests.., that I inherited from my deceased mother" to Marjorie's sons
John and William Steger. 155 The executors of Martha Lou's estate
purported to assign to Muenster Drilling Co. the Maddox ## 2, 3 and
4 leases on September 1, 1994.156 Marjorie then filed suit to eject
Muenster, claiming that neither Carrie nor Martha Lou had the power
to execute oil and gas leases that extended beyond the period of their
lifetimes on the property they received under John Maddox's will.
57
148See id. at 366; Will of Carrie T. Maddox, § 9 (Nov. 7, 1958) (on file with author).
149 See Will of Carrie T. Maddox, supra note 148, § 9.
150See Steger, 134 S.W.3d at 366.
151 See id.
152 See id.; Will of Dan Hughes, Jr., pt. V (Sept. 4, 1987) (on file with author).
153 See Steger, 134 S.W.3d at 366.
15 See id.
155 Will of Martha Lou Hughes, item IX.C (Mar. 12, 1993) (on file with author); Steger,
134 S.W.3d at 366.
156 See Muenster Defendants' Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiffs,
William L. (Bill) Steger, Jr. and John Marshall Steger, Against Said Muenster Defendants at 5,
Steger v. Muenster Drilling Co., No. 96-05-0141M-CV (Tex. Dist. June 24, 2001) (on file with
author); Steger, 134 S.W.3d at 366.
157 See Steger, 134 S.W.3d at 366-67; Steger v. Muenster Drilling Co., No. 96-05-0141M-
CV (Tex. Dist. June 24, 2003), aff'd 134 S.W.3d 359 (Tex. App. 2003) (on file with author).
John and William Steger brought a separate action to eject Muenster, claiming unsuccess-
fully that, with respect to their interest in the tracts, the leases had been extinguished when they
merged, at the death of Dan Hughes, with the greater estate held by Martha Lou Hughes. See
Steger, 134 S.W.3d at 367. Marjorie Maddox Steger unsuccessfully raised the same claim in her
suit. See id. at 367, 375-78. The doctrine of merger of estates is beyond the scope of this Article.
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As such, the leases in favor of Dan Hughes were cancelled, at the
latest, as of Martha Lou's death.
58
At trial, it was stipulated that John's will expressly and clearly
granted to Carrie and Martha Lou the right to execute oil leases even
on tracts where, up to that time, there had been no drilling for oil. It
was likewise undisputed that, without that express authorization, un-
der the law of waste neither Carrie nor Martha Lou would have been
entitled to open new wells.' 59 The question before the court became
one of will interpretation: were the powers granted to Carrie and Mar-
tha Lou to lease for oil such as would permit them to grant leaseholds
for terms that would continue beyond their own deaths?' 6°
The trial court ruled that Marjorie took the remainder subject to the
leases, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.'16 What is
most intriguing about these rulings is that they interpret the language
of the will in very different ways. Without a great deal of elaboration,
the trial court made alternative determinations: first, that the will's
plain meaning authorized leases that could extend beyond the death of
the life tenant; and second, that the will was ambiguous, but that in
the light of extrinsic evidence it became clear that the will authorized
the leases in question. The relevant extrinsic evidence was the cir-
cumstances surrounding the execution of the will and the practices of
the oil industry with which John was familiar. The Court of Appeals
appeared convinced by the plain-language argument and provided
reasoning to bolster it. Its analysis proceeded in the following nearly
syllogistic manner: (1) (a) "[the] will gave Carrie 'full[] power and
authority' to 'manage, control and lease' [the property] 'for all pur-
poses ... during her life time and to extract therefrom all oil, gas and
or other minerals'";162 (b) "[the] will gave Martha Lou power, 'during
• .. her life time,' to 'make leases of whatever nature' on [the prop-
erty] 'and to extract therefrom all oil, gas and/or other minerals...
over which ...she may have control'"; 163 (2) (a) "[t]he word 'all'
means 'every,' and 'purpose' means 'something set up as an object or
58 See Steger, 134 S.w.3d at 367.
159 The law of waste protects remaindermen against overexploitation of the land by the life
tenant's opening up new mines or wells. It states that the life tenant of real property may not
authorize drilling for oil. See Swayne v. Lone Acre Oil Co., 86 S.W. 740, 742 (Tex. 1905)
(stating that it is not waste for a life tenant to work an open mine, but it is waste to open a new
mine); MCZ, Inc. v. Smith, 707 S.W.2d 672, 679 (Tex. App. 1986) (asserting that mining dissi-
pates the corpus of an estate); see also Moore v. Vines, 474 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex. 1971) (stat-
ing that mineral rights are not part of the rights afforded to one with a life estate). The law
applicable in Moore will be further developed infra in Part 11IB.
160 See Steger, 134 S.W.3d at 367.
161 Id. at 377.
162 Id. at 373 (second alteration in original) (omission in original) (citation omitted).
,
63 Id. (omissions in original) (citation omitted).
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end to be attained: INTENTION"'; 64 (b) "'[w]hatever' means 'of any
kind at all ' " 65 and "'[n]ature' means 'a kind or class usu[ally] distin-
guished by fundamental or essential characteristics"'; 1 66 (3) therefore,
we hold that J.W.'s will unambiguously authorized Carrie to
lease his half of the community for every end that she sought
to attain, including the end of making oil and gas leases that
extended beyond her lifetime, and gave Martha Lou the
power to execute oil and gas leases of any kind of class at all,
including those that extended beyond her lifetime.
67
Although this syllogism is itself a complete plain-language analy-
sis, the court ventured further for support of a different sort. It stated
that were it not to interpret the will in this way, leasing for oil and gas
might in some cases be stymied:
Indeed, if a life tenant is granted the power to lease, but can-
not bind future interests, "there is very little utility to the
power because of the natural reluctance of any lessee to ac-
cept a lease which might be terminated by the death of the
lessor."'
' 68
My objective in raising Steger as a decision that merits further ex-
amination is not to argue that the decision in Steger was wrong. Rea-
sonable minds will certainly disagree about the proper outcome.
When examined in the light of the law applicable to cases like Steger,
though, it becomes a particularly good lens through which to criticize
the new Restatement's blurring of the line between interpretation and
construction.
B. Applicable Law
The issues in Steger required an examination of (1) the scope of a
life tenant's entitlement to exploit property and (2) what the law re-
quires for the creation of powers that authorize a life tenant to exploit
the property in additional ways. The specific issue presented was
whether a legatee given a life tenancy and the power to extract oil and
gas from real property may execute oil and gas leases that extend
beyond the period of her own lifetime.
164 Id. (citation omitted).
165 Id. at 373-74 (citation omitted).
166 Id. at 374 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
167 Id.
168 Id. (quoting I EUGENE KuNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 8.1, at 214
(1987))..
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1. Life Estates
No particular words are necessary to create a life estate. 69 The ba-
sic rights of a life tenant are those of possession, management, and
control, 170 including the right to reap the profits and income accrued
during the tenancy.' 7' The specific mention that the life tenant has the
power to "manage and conserve" or to "possess and control" the
property is no enlargement of the ordinary powers of a life tenant.1
72
This grant entitles the life tenant to "all the ordinary uses to which the
property is accustomed to be put or to which it is adapted,"' 173 but it
does not entitle him to sell or dispose of the property. 174
The grant of a life estate carries with it "the privilege of leasing the
property ... for any use that does not amount to waste,"'' 75 for a life
tenant's right to lease the property is simply part of his entitlement to
derive income from the property and to commit it to all ordinary
uses. t 7 6 Any lease executed by a life tenant, though, is limited to the
period of his own lifetime. 177 More specifically,
a lease given by a life tenant is terminated with his death and
169See Welch v. Straach, 531 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Tex. 1975).
17034 TEx. JUR. 3D Estates § 32 (1984) (explaining that a life tenant's rights are restricted
to possession, management, and control unless the deed or will states otherwise); WILLIAM A.
STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 2.11, at 59-60 (2000) (explaining
the rights and duties of a life tenant); Medlin v. Medlin, 203 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947) (stating that the words "use and benefit" are sum and substance of a life estate), cited in
34 TEx. JUR. 3D Estates § 32 n.65; Brown v. Wood, 239 S.W.2d 195, 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951)
(citing Medlin, 203 S.W.2d at 639) (same).
171 See Murphy v. Slaton, 273 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tex. 1954) (stating that life tenants are en-
titled to the income, rents, revenues, and benefits accruing during their life); Wagnon v.
Wagnon, 16 S.W.2d 366, 370 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) (holding that life tenants are entitled to all
profits and income absent a contrary restriction).
17274 TEx. JUR. 3D Wills § 240 (2000); Wagnon, 16 S.W.2d at 367, 370 (holding that the
bequest of residue to husband "to use, possess and control as his own individual property so
long as he may live" passed life estate with no power of disposition).
17334 TEx. JUR. 3D Estates § 35 (1984).
174 Hobson v. Shelton, 302 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Wagnon, 16 S.W.2d at
369; see also Swayne v. Lone Acre Oil Co., 86 S.W. 740, 742 (Tex. 1905) (finding buyers of a
life tenant's property interest were not entitled to any part of the proceeds of oil extracted from
the land).
175 STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 170, § 4.8.
176 See 34 Tax. JUR. 3D Estates § 32 (1984).
17 7 See MCZ, Inc. v. Smith, 707 S.W.2d 672, 680 (Tex. App. 1986) (noting that a life ten-
ant has power to lease, but only to the extent of her life estate); see also Steger v. Muenster
Drilling Co., 134 S.W.3d 359, 373 & n.37 (Tex. App. 2003) (stating that a life tenant cannot
convey an estate that is greater than the one tied to her life); Benson v. Greenville Nat'l Exch.
Bank, 253 S.W.2d 918, 922 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (holding a life tenant's transfer of her estate
effects the transfer of a life estate for the life of the grantor); Osborne v. Osborne, 138 S.W.
1062, 1063 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) (holding a lease granted by a life tenant expires upon the
death of the life tenant); Morris v. Eddins, 44 S.W. 203, 204 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898) (holding a
life tenant may convey only a life estate measured by his own life).
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the right of possession of his lessee is likewise terminated for
the reason that a life tenant has no power to grant an interest
in the property greater than that which he himself holds and
because the lessee of a life tenant is charged with notice of
the extent of his landlord's title.
1 78
Such a limitation prevents the life tenant from dissipating the cor-
pus of the estate, which would impinge upon the interests of the re-
maindermen and constitute waste. 179 In addition to his rights and
privileges, the life tenant possesses the responsibility to maintain the
property, 180 including payment of taxes and mortgage interest.
181
Despite a life tenant's broad powers, the position of the life tenant
is essentially that of a quasi-trustee who must preserve the corpus of
the estate for the remainderman.182 The temptation not to do so is
great. "A life tenant will have an incentive to maximize not the value
of the property ... but only the present value of the earnings stream
obtainable during his expected lifetime."
' 183
This temptation is especially strong where the property is valuable
for uses the life tenant is prohibited from exercising, for instance the
mining of minerals. The law of waste addresses this temptation, for
example, by forbidding the life tenant from "inaugurat[ing] exploita-
tion of the minerals in the land" unless he and the remainderman do
so together. 184 This is so even though the right to lease the property is
178 Annotation, Life Tenant's Death as Affecting Rights under Lease Given by Him, 14
A.L.R.4TH 1054 § 2 (1982) [hereinafter Annotation, Life Tenant's Death]; see also Montgomery
v. Browder, 930 S.W.2d 772, 778 (Tex. App. 1996) ("The general rule in Texas is that one who
buys property must, at his peril, ascertain the ownership of the property." (citing Kimbell Mill-
ing Co. v. Greene, 162 S.W.2d 991, 996 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942), affd, 170 S.W.2d 191 (Tex.
1943))).
179 See Enserch Exploration, Inc. v. Wimmer, 718 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex. App. 1986).
180See Coleman v. Banks, 349 S.W.2d 737, 741 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
181 See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 170, § 2.11; Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Bry-
son, 219 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Tex. 1949); Collett v. Collett, 217 S.W.2d 60, 65 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948); Brokaw v. Richardson, 255 S.W. 685,688 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
182 See Clyde v. Hamilton, 414 S.W.2d 434, 439 (Tex. 1967) ("A life tenant may not dis-
pose of the corpus of the estate. It is to be preserved for the remaindermen."); Wagnon v.
Wagnon, 16 S.W.2d 366, 370 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
183 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 83-84 (5th ed. 1998), quoted in
JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 224 (4th ed. 1998); cf. DUKEMINIER &
JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 929-36 (illustrating trustee's duty to manage corpus so as to "pro-
duce a reasonable income while being preserved for the remainderman") (reproducing Dennis v.
R.I. Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 744 F.2d 893 (1st Cir. 1984)).
84 55 TEx. JuR. 3D Oil and Gas § 24 (1987); RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL
AND GAS § 5.2(B), at 214-15 (3d ed. 1991) ("Where the ownership of the mineral estate is
divided between a life tenant and a remainderman, although neither may... drill for oil and gas
separately, they may do so jointly."); see also Swayne v. Lone Acre Oil Co., 86 S.W. 740, 742
(Tex. 1905) (noting that tenant of a life estate who is punishable for waste has no right to initiate
oil extraction); MCZ, Inc. v. Smith 707 S.W.2d 672, 679 (Tex. App. 1986) (noting life tenant of
real property may lease to the extent of her life estate but may not authorize drilling for oil).
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subsumed within the life tenant's right to draw income from the prop-
erty because mining dissipates the corpus of an estate rendering the
life tenant liable to the remainderman for waste.185
2. Powers to Consume
The foregoing description of life estates reveals that a life tenant
may not inaugurate oil production without the consent of the remain-
dermen. A life tenant would be impeachable for waste for so doing.
Moreover, oil and gas leases traditionally pass a fee simple determin-
able, and a life tenant may not convey a fee simple no matter how
much he desires to, 186 even by will, because his own life estate is of a
lesser quantum than a fee simple. 187 If a life tenant purports to convey
a fee, the conveyance is good only to the extent of his life estate. 88
The grantor of a life estate may grant the life tenant the power to
consume the corpus of the estate, to execute leases that extend beyond
her own lifetime, or even to convey fee simple title in the estate.1
89
'
85 See 55 TEX. JUR. 3D Oil and Gas § 98 (1987) ("The general rule that neither a life ten-
ant nor a remainderman, without the joinder of the other, may develop oil and gas on or remove
it from the property subject to their successive estates prevents either from executing along a
valid mineral lease."). The open mine doctrine is an exception to this rule. Moore v. Vines, 474
S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex. 1971). It holds that where "mines were opened by the grantor before he
created the life estate, it is presumed that the grantor intended the life tenant to be able to con-
tinue mining. But if the mines were not open before the life estate was created, the life tenant
cannot open them." DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 183 at 225 n.23; see also Swayne v.
Lone Acre Oil Co., 86 S.W. 740, 742 (Tex. 1905) (describing open mine doctrine as "well
settled").
86 See Montgomery v. Browder, 930 S.W.2d 772, 778 (Tex. App. 1996); First Nat'l Bank
of Amarillo v. Amarillo Nat'l Bank, 531 S.W.2d 905, 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
187 See Montgomery, 930 S.W.2d at 776 (explaining that a life estate is not converted to a
fee simple estate even when the life tenant has full powers of disposition); First Nat'l Bank of
Amarillo, 531 S.W.2d at 907 (explaining that a life estate is an insufficient interest to establish a
grant of an easement beyond the duration of the life estate); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 235 S.W.2d
744, 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) ("The life tenant owns the estate only for life, which is a lesser
estate than the fee or inheritance which belongs to the remaindermen."), rev'd on other grounds
244 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. 1951); Morris v. Eddins, 44 S.W. 203, 204 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898) (stating
that a grantor possessing life estate cannot grant greater estate than that limited by his own life);
55 TEX. JuR. 3D Oil and Gas, § 95 (1987) ("The extent to which a mineral owner may grant oil
and gas rights to another by lease is necessarily controlled for the nature of the interest owned
by the grantor or by the person whom he legally represents.").
188 Zambrano v. Olivas, 490 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); see also Strong v.
Garrett, 224 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Tex. 1949) (holding that a life tenant's title is a "limitation ti-
tle"); MCZ Inc., 707 S.W.2d at 680 (holding that surviving spouse who inherited life estate in
her husband's one-half of the community property estate had power to lease only to the extent
of her life estate but could not authorize drilling for oil); Benson v. Greenville Nat'l Exch. Bank,
253 S.W.2d 918, 922 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (explaining that the effect of conveying a life estate
is to "create in the grantee an estate for the life of the grantor").
189 Steger v. Muenster Drilling Co., 134 S.W.3d 359, 373 & nn.38-39 (Tex. App. 2003)
(citing Amarillo Oil Co. v. McBride, 67 S.W.2d 1098, 1100-01 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); see also
Glass v. Skelly Oil Co., 469 S.W.2d 237, 240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (holding that "the life
estates coupled with the executory powers enumerated constitute the authority of the life tenant
to execute the leases"); 55 TEX. JUR. 3D Oil and Gas § 24 (1987) ("A life tenant may, of course,
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But this does not enlarge the life estate to a fee. 190 This sort of power
is not even an estate but a mere authority to dispose of the fee.' 9'
There is no doubt that the exercise of such a power threatens the
diminution of the remaindermen's interest. The power, though, is not
itself repugnant to the remainder but merely defeats it if exercised., 
92
The power described above is a departure from the legal definition
of a life estate. Without express and very clear language granting this
additional power, courts refuse to construe wills as bestowing them.
This is primarily because the powers allow the life tenant to derogate
from the powers already vested in him, and there is no such thing as a
power of sale by implication. 93 In the extensive litigation over am-
biguous language in this context, 194 courts narrowly construe any lan-
guage purporting to grant these powers. 95 For example, a conveyance
granting a life tenant the express right to open new mines or to exe-
cute leases that would normally continue beyond the period of the life
tenancy permits the life tenant to lease for a period in excess of her
own lifetime.' 96 By contrast, a will granting a life tenant merely "all
be expressly granted the power and right to drill wells after the inception of his estate by the
instrument creating the estate."); DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 183, at 226 ("The person
creating a legal life estate can draft the instrument so as to give the life tenant a power to sell or
mortgage a fee simple or to lease beyond the duration of the life estate. A life estate can be
coupled with any number of powers to do specific acts not otherwise permitted the life tenant.").
190See Montgomery, 930 S.W.2d at 777; 74 TEX. JUR. 3D Wills § 240 (1990) (citing Edds
v. Mitchell, 184 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. 1945)).
191 See Edds, 184 S.W.2d at 825.
192Id.; see also In re Lewis, 749 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. App. 1988) (citing Edds, 184
S.W.2d at 823); cf Sterner v. Nelson, 314 N.W.2d 263 (Neb. 1982), reprinted in DuKEMINIER
& JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 677-80 (applying rule of repugnancy nullifying attempt to reduce
by subsequent language a fee simple already granted); White v. Brown, 559 S.W.2d 938, 941
(Tenn. 1977).
193 See Glass, 469 S.W.2d at 241 (holding that oil and gas leases executed by life tenants
were valid when the will which created the life estate clearly conveyed the right to execute such
leases); Amarillo Oil Co., 67 S.W.2d at 1101 (upholding will provision that any lease executed
by life tenant would "remain in the lessee, his heirs and assigns," with rents and royalties pay-
able to the remaindermen); EUGENE 0. KuNTz ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS
LAW 408 (3d ed. 1998) (citing Moore v. Vines, 474 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. 1971)).
A life estate tenant... cannot dispose of the corpus of the estate unless expressly au-
thorized to do so. An implied power to dispose of the corpus by the life tenant of an
express life estate does not exist in Texas. And words that confer a right to use, pos-
sess, and control the property do not confer any authority to expend, sell, or, dispose
of it.
34 TEx. JUR. 3D Estates § 45 (1984) (citing Hobson v. Shelton, 302 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1957) (citing Wagnon v. Wagnon, 16 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929)).
194 See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 681.
195 See, e.g., Daniels v. Moore, 712 S.W.2d 621, 622 (Tex. App. 1986) (holding that life
tenant with power of sale has no power to divest herself of the property by gift); Ellis v. Bruce,
286 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (discussing a will granting one life tenant the power
to consume but granting another life tenant no such power).
196 Glass, 469 S.W.2d at 238.
JUDICIAL DISCRETION
rents, revenues and income of every kind and character [derived]
from the real estate" and the right to execute "leases ... [for] oil and
gas" does not because it lacks the requisite clarity. 197 Likewise, "if the
life tenant has the power to sell the property and grant title in fee sim-
ple, [he may], afortiori ... lease the property for a term that ... ex-
tend[s] beyond his death."1 98 But, if the standard is that consumption
is limited to the maintenance and support of the life tenant, then the
power to consume may not extend beyond his lifetime, since the stan-
dard itself is applicable only while the life tenant lives.' 99 Further-
more, even a life tenant with the power to dispose of the corpus may
not convey the mineral interest to herself by conveying it first to third
parties so that they may reconvey it to her.2° In sum, the power to
lease beyond one's own lifetime exists only when the life tenant is
expressly given this right, has the power to dispose of the estate, or
has the consent of the remaindermen.2 z1
Under the foregoing principles, mineral leases conveyed by life
tenants are especially vulnerable to attack. Even when the life tenant
is granted the power to consume the corpus, a court may determine
that, in the context of a mineral lease, the lease nonetheless terminates
upon the death of the life tenant.20 2 In many jurisdictions, the common
lease form establishes a fee simple determinable by conveying to the
lessee a working interest in the mineral estate for a primary term "and
as long thereafter as oil and gas or other hydrocarbons are being pro-
duced., 20 3 Although this is a standard form lease, a grantor may
197 Hudspeth v. Hudspeth, 673 S.W.2d 248, 250 (Tex. App. 1984).
198Annotation, Life Tenant's Death, supra note 178, § 2 (emphasis added); see, e.g.,
Anderson v. Kennon, 353 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (holding that life tenant had
power to mortgage, sell, and convey without limitation); Guest v. Bizzell, 271 S.W.2d 472, 473
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (holding that the will authorized wife "to sell and convey any part of such
property"); Amarillo Oil Co., 67 S.W.2d at 1099 (holding that grantee had express right to
"receive therefrom all the benefits as completely as though he had a fee simple title" and to
execute oil and gas leases to extend beyond his lifetime); Annotation, Life Tenant's Death,
supra note 178, § 2 ("The court acknowledged the general rule that a life tenant has no authority
to execute a lease for a term longer than his lifetime but deemed the rule inapplicable in this
case because the life tenant also possessed a power of disposition with respect to the property."
(discussing Givens v. Givens, 387 S.W.2d 851 (Ky. 1965))); 55 TEX. JUR. 3D Oil and Gas § 98
(1984).
199See Guest, 271 S.W.2d at 476; cf. Montgomery v. Browder, 930 S.W.2d 772, 777 (Tex.
App. 1996) (granting full powers of disposition, limited by perceived need).200See Anderson, 353 S.W.2d at 245.
201 See Annotation, Life Tenant's Death, supra note 178, § 2; JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS
LAW IN A NUTSHELL 102-03 (3d ed. 1995).
202 See Waters v. Monroe Coal Co., 54 Ohio Misc. 37, 376 N.E.2d 977 (Ct. Com. P1.
1977), cited in Annotation, Life Tenant's Death, supra note 178, § 6.
203 EUGENE 0. KUNTZ, ET AL, FORMS MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY CASES AND MATERIAL ON
OIL AND GAS LAW 12 (3d ed. 1998) (Texas oil and gas lease). In Texas, the law is that an oil
and gas lease containing this language conveys a fee simple determinable. See 51 TEX. JUR. 3D
Mines and Minerals § 29 (2000); 55 TEX. JUR. 3D Oil and Gas § 163 (2000) (listing cases).
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"transfer to another an interest in the oil and gas therein which may be
a mere license, option, estate for life, or for years, as certainly as it
may be a fee simple or determinable fee estate.,,204 This, of course,
means that oil and gas leases are not necessarily fees simple deter-
minable, °5 but can be made the subject of a lesser interest, even a life
estate.
C. Analysis
The Steger case is a remarkable illustration of the awkward
fashion in which courts approach matters of will interpretation. The
trial court, apparently flummoxed about whether to describe the will
as ambiguous or unambiguous, proceeded to make alternative rulings,
one based on the view that the will's language was plain, and the
other based on the view that it was not. At the very least, making
alternative rulings was itself a radical departure from will
interpretation principles. When the words of a will are not ambiguous,
a court must interpret a will on the basis of its express language
alone 206 must not introduce extrinsic evidence,20 7 and must not resort
to artificial rules of construction.20 8 If the trial court does consider the
instrument ambiguous, it must make that determination as a matter of
law20 9 before admitting extrinsic evidence on the question of the
testator's intent.210 This approach, of course, does not prevent a court
from attempting to make identifications and, in that way, exposing
latent ambiguities in the will.211 As stated above, such an exercise is
central to the will interpretation process.21 2 The purpose behind
requiring a court to make a determination as to ambiguity after
making identifications, but before ruling on intent, is to prevent a
court from using extrinsic evidence to concoct an ambiguity in a will
213
where none otherwise exists.
214 Curry v. Tex. Co., 18 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
205 See id.
206 Henderson v. Parker, 728 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Tex. 1987).
207 Odeneal v. Van Horn, 678 S.W.2d 941, 942 (Tex. 1984).
208 Perry v. Hinshaw, 633 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1982).
209 Exxon Corp. v. W. Tex. Gathering Co., 868 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. 1993) (construing a
contract).210 See id.
211 See supra notes 67-107 and accompanying text (discussing identifications);
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 424-25 ("A latent ambiguity is an ambiguity that
does not appear on the face of the will but appears when the terms of the will are applied to the
testator's property or designated beneficiaries.").
212 See supra p. 76 ("[MIaking connections between the symbols on the page and the prop-
erty and beneficiaries to which those symbols refer lies at the very heart of carrying out a testa-
tor's duly executed estate plan ....").213 San Antonio Area Found. v. Lang, 35 S.W.3d 636, 640 (Tex. 2000).
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The clear import of the foregoing principles is that, when a court
determines provisions in a will to be unambiguous, that court is no
longer in the position to declare the very same provisions ambiguous.
As such, the court must declare the intent of the testator using the
terms of the will alone and without the aid of extrinsic evidence. In
Steger, the trial court did not follow this well-established approach.
Instead, it declared that, from the four corners and in light of extrinsic
evidence, John Maddox's will authorized Carrie and Martha Lou to
execute oil and gas leases that would continue in force beyond their
deaths.214 The trial court was not merely making alternative rulings,
as a court might when resolving a dispute using different bodies of
applicable law. Rather, the court was announcing inconsistent legal
positions regarding the questions of the will's clarity or ambiguity
and, in this way, departed from the well-settled law of will
interpretation. In ruling that the will was unambiguous, the trial court
was, under settled legal principles, foreclosed from declaring it in the
same breath to be ambiguous.
In contrast to the trial court, the Court of Appeals, certain of the
will's clarity, attempted a straightforward plain-meaning analysis,
complete with dictionary definitions. 215 But as if admitting it had
taken too easy of a way out, the court then sought shelter in a pur-
ported constructional preference for "utilitarian" outcomes.21 6 In es-
sence, then, the court leapt from plain meaning all the way to con-
struction, completely sidestepping the use of extrinsic evidence to
resolve ambiguity. Its decision is a good example of the one-step in-
terpretive method advocated by the ALI. Although it champions the
testator's intention throughout, the Restatement very nearly invites
courts to employ whatever interpretive method offers the most effica-
cious route to a satisfactory outcome. This method insufficiently cab-
ins judicial impulses to pursue administrative efficiency in all cases.
In the Steger case in particular, the effect of this muddling of interpre-
tive approaches-using rules of construction to confirm a plain-
meaning analysis-calls the very integrity of the decision into ques-
tion. Indeed, the court itself, in casting about for a rationale, seems
somewhat uncertain about how best to dispose of the matter.
One of the primary reasons the Court of Appeals' decision fails to
inspire confidence is that, once it undertakes to attribute utilitarian
intention to the language of the will through the use of a purported
constructional preference, it should address other rules of construction
214 See supra p. 88.
215 See supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
216 See Steger v. Muenster Drilling Co., 134 S.W.3d 359, 374 n.45, 375 n.51 (Tex. App.
2003).
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that have more obvious applicability. For example, a primary rule of
will construction is that all parts of a will shall be harmonized if pos-
sible,217 and "a latter clause in a will must be deemed to affirm, not to
contradict, an earlier clause in the same will." '218 Additionally,
"[e]very sentence, clause and word must be considered in construing
a will and, if possible, effect must be given to all its provisions. 219
Consistent with these principles, a predominant clause does not swal-
low a subsidiary clause where the subsidiary clause "clearly or ex-
pressly modifies the former., 220 Finally, "a clearly expressed intention
of the testator contained in one part of the will should not yield to a
doubtful construction in any other portion thereof.,
221
In his will, John Maddox expressly granted Carrie the right to ex-
tract oil and gas from the property "during said period of her life es-
tate" and granted Martha Lou the right to extract oil and gas from the
property "during ...her life time. '222 These words alone, as seen
above, are insufficient to grant these life tenants the right to extract oil
and gas from the property after their deaths.223 In fact, the will states
in plain language that the power to extract oil and gas is limited to the
period of the life tenants' respective lifetimes. The court's neglect of
relevant rules of construction that would have required reversal of the
lower court's decision makes it appear particularly geared toward a
predetermined outcome. Moreover, the decision has the effect of ren-
dering meaningless John Maddox's grant of a limited power to extract
oil and gas from the property. To read the words "for all purposes"
and "of whatever nature" as granting Carrie and Martha Lou full
power to invade the corpus of the estate and bind the remaindermen-
in essence, full power to commit waste against the interests of the
remaindermen-requires contradicting entirely the clear expression
that permits them to extract oil and gas only during their respective
lifetimes. The result is to set them apart from the other language of
the provisions and to give them a life of their own.
In fairness to the Steger court, it should be noted that the case did
not involve problems with identification of persons or property. We
saw above how the law of will interpretation, in particular the law
governing the admissibility of extrinsic evidence, was developed
largely through the lens of cases where identifications had gone
217 Houston v. Harberger, 377 S.W.2d 673, 677 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
218 Id.
219 Irons v. Fort Worth Sand & Gravel Co., 260 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
22 0Burmey v. Burney, 197 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Tex. 1946).22 1 Id.
222 Steger v. Muenster Drilling Co., 134 S.W.3d 359, 364, 373 (Tex. App. 2003).
223 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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somehow awry.224 Cases like Steger, though, where it is the quantum
of present possessory estates and future interests devised that is in
question, are distinct. As stated above, courts tend to view descrip-
tions of the quantum of estates and powers bequeathed to the benefi-
ciaries as examples of technical legal terms with fixed meanings. 25 In
leaping from plain meaning to construction, the Steger court was sim-
ply following the lead of other courts. In White v. Brown,226 for ex-
ample, a testator executed a will devising her house to her sister-in-
law Evelyn "to live in and not to be sold., 227 A dispute ensued about
whether Evelyn received a life estate or a fee simple absolute.228 The
trial court held the language plainly devised a life estate and refused
to admit extrinsic evidence to interpret its meaning. 229 The Tennessee
Supreme Court reversed,230 holding the language was ambiguous.23'
But instead of admitting extrinsic evidence, as we might expect, of
the testator's relationship with her surviving relatives, the court intro-
duced statutory presumptions in favor of fee simple estates and
against intestacy to hold that the devise was of a fee simple absolute
followed by a repugnant and, thus, invalid restraint on alienation.232
Since the testator had not clearly described a life estate, the law pre-
sumed she conveyed a fee.233 Although her will made it look as if the
testator wished to restrain the alienation of the fee conveyed to Eve-
lyn, the law forbade it.
234
White illustrates that in cases involving questions about the quan-
tum of estates, locating and carrying out the testator's actual intent is
not a priority. References to ambiguity in such cases often have noth-
ing to do with clarifying a testator's actual intent. Rather they deal
with standardizing or categorizing conveyances based on the reality
that the "law will enforce as property only those interests that con-
form to a limited number of standard forms. 235 This "numerus
clausus," or fixed-number principle, has long been characteristic of
the Anglo-American system of estates in land and future interests.2
36
224 See supra notes 61-107 and accompanying text.
225 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
226559 S.W.2d 938 (Tenn. 1977).
2271 d. at 938.
228 Id. at 939.
2 29 Id.
230 Id. at 941.
231 Id. at 939.
232 Id. at 939-4 1.
2 33 Id. at 940.234 Id. at 941.
235 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Prop-
erty: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2000). The forms themselves are
familiar to any student of property.236 See id.
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It is thought to be a particularly effective way to promote marketabil-
ity through "optimal standardization. 237 In will interpretation matters,
it is understandable that such a system of technical rules is frequently
intent defeating.238 The legal presumptions and rules of law estab-
lished to prevent tampering with the system virtually prevent any
description of an estate in land from being equivocal. The same rules
would seem to foreclose a finding that an estate was somehow misde-
scribed, since, as White illustrates, the law channels awkwardly
phrased estates in the direction of marketability. And given that testa-
tors infrequently refer with any specificity to the categories that make
up the system of estates-as they might refer to other legal concepts
such as heirs or even real property-personal usage evidence would
be of little assistance in these cases. In the absence of the will's pos-
ing some problem relating to the identification of persons or property,
courts simply do not interpret the will at all. Consequently, any claim
of ambiguity in such cases serves less to indicate that a court is pursu-
ing a testator's actual intent than it does to indicate that a court is un-
dertaking to force the conveyance into an inflexible legal framework,
which may in fact result in the testator's intent being defeated.239
As for Steger, it is true that the facts are not completely analogous
to White. Unlike the testator in White, John Maddox had a lawyer
draft his will, and nothing about its language causes us to question the
quantum of estates he wished to devise to his family. Nonetheless, as
we saw above, the legal approach to powers is as inflexible in the
context of legal life estates as is the system of estates itself.2 40 The
court, though, did not mention the rule of law requiring all grants of
powers that derogate from the legal parameters of a life estate to be
express and clear. Its resort to and selective use of 1994 dictionary
definitions to reveal the "plain language" of a will that took effect in
1933 reveals that the language of the will did not meet the legal
standard.
At the risk of violating the interpretive approach courts employ in
disputes over the quantum of estates, I would like to engage in a bit of
speculation about how the court might have reacted had it found John
Maddox's will ambiguous and had resorted to extrinsic evidence. One
possible rendition of the opinion would have posited that without
question, as an entrepreneur in oil production, John was familiar with
the workings of the oil industry and knew that oil and gas leases cus-
tomarily contained not only a primary term but also a secondary term
237 See id. at 8.
238 See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 710.
239 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 235, at 7.
240 See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
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in the nature of a fee simple determinable. 241 The trial court con-
cluded from this fact that John must have intended for Carrie and
Martha to have the power to execute oil and gas leases that would
endure beyond the period of their respective lifetimes. A careful study
of John's will discloses a definite plan to provide first for his wife
during her life and thereafter for his children for their lives. The crea-
tion of these successive life estates followed by a remainder in fee for
his grandchildren or surviving children is characteristic of a testamen-
tary scheme to preserve the corpus of the estate for future generations.
Since mining dissipates the corpus of an estate,242 it is plausible that
John would wish to grant life tenants only limited powers to extract
oil and gas from the property. He did this, as explained above, by
expressly granting Carrie and Martha Lou the right to extract oil and
gas from the property during their lives alone.
Another rendition of the decision might sound like the following:
John Maddox was an oil entrepreneur and knew the standard form
lease in Texas was beyond the power of life tenants to execute absent
the grant of special powers. He knew that the Nocona oil field was
vast and that its exploitation was only beginning to take place. It
makes sense that in discussing oil leases in the context of life estates
in his will, he would contemplate granting powers that the life tenants
would not otherwise have, while keeping the land in his family. This
suggests that in granting his surviving spouse and daughter the power
to open new wells, he was in fact authorizing each to execute leases
in the standard form, despite what would otherwise be the limitations
of her life interest.
The foregoing speculations are admittedly rather fanciful. As a
practical matter, given the type of case it was deciding, the court was
not bound to admit extrinsic evidence and engage in fact-specific
analysis of actual intent. Moreover, under the Restatement's new one-
step interpretive approach, the court could undertake a search for ac-
tual intent or attributed intent or neither at its option, given that it had
determined the language to be plain on its face. But even alluding to
the possibility that John was attempting to preserve his estate for fu-
ture generations would have strengthened the analysis more than rely-
ing on authorities that did not exist at the time John wrote his will and
would not have been binding upon his testamentary act even if they
had. What is significant is that the story the court did feel compelled
to tell was the one relating to certain utilitarian practices of the oil
241 See, e.g., Guess v. Harmonson, 4 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Guinn Inv.,
Inc. v. Ridge Oil Co., 73 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. App. 2002).242 See Moore v. Vines, 474 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex. 1972).
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industry. Although unclear from the reported decision, in the course
of the litigation, Muenster Drilling had argued in favor of just such a
"utilitarian interpretation" of the will. 243 The claim appeared to be
that, given John's knowledge of the oil business, he would have been
foolish not to have conformed the terms of his will in favor of more
rather than less production. While this may in fact be true of John, the
interpretive method employed flies in the face of Holmes's admoni-
tion that, in construing a will, the task of a court is to determine not
what a testator meant but failed to say but, rather, to determine what
he has said. 244 This means that the court should, at the very least, have
examined John's will not through the lens of what the oil industry
wishes he had said but, after removing the overlay of utilitarianism,
with an eye to interpreting what he did say. Insofar as the court was
claiming that John's will was meant to be read to conform with and
support common practices of the oil industry, it succeeded in treading
on the paramount concern of wills law-the freedom of testation.245
The foregoing analysis underscores how little confidence the
decision in Steger inspires. Sometimes people do write wills that are
unreasonable, quirky, idiosyncratic, and even antisocial. Not everyone
devising or bequeathing property has in mind its highest and best or
most economically efficient use. None of these considerations seem
to matter much when courts are analyzing language describing the
quantum of estates. If this is so, courts should forthrightly state that it
is not their mission to vindicate testatorial intention in such cases so
much as it is to fit the language within the limited number of
categories within the system of estates in land and future interests, a
system many testators have never contemplated and many lawyers
misunderstand.
The ALI should reconsider its proposal to adopt wholesale the
streamlined, one-step approach to will interpretation that, in quantum
of estates cases, is so useful for pursuing the standardization policy
243 Defendants Muenster Drilling Company, Inc.'s First Amended Responses to Plaintiff's
Marjorie Maddox Steger's Request for Disclosure, Steger v. Muenster Drilling Co., No. 96-05-
0141M-CV (Tex. Dist. June 24,2001) (on file with author).
24See Holmes, supra note 40, at 418; see also Shriner's Hosp. for Crippled Children of
Tex. v. Stahl, 610 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Tex. 1980); Kirk v. Beard, 345 S.W.2d 267, 273 (Tex.
1961) ("The question is not what the testator intended to write but what is the meaning of the
words he actually used."); White v. Taylor, 286 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1956); Kokemot v. Denman,
708 S.W.2d 921, 924 (Tex. App. 1986) ("The question is not what the testatrix intended to
write, but the meaning of the words she actually used." (citing Rekdahl v. Long, 417 S.W.2d
387, 389 (Tex. 1967))); Poole v. Starke, 324 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (citing
Kennard v. Kennard, 84 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
245 See Farmer v. Dodson, 326 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) ("It is not for courts,
juries, relatives, or friends to say how property should be passed by will, or to rewrite a will for
a testator because they do not believe he made a wise or fair distribution of his property.").
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unique to that context. The ALI should reaffirm the two-step
sequential approach to will interpretation in cases involving
ambiguous identifications so as to bring that body of cases back into
better alignment with the policy of vindicating the testator's intent.
Such a reaffirmation would result in more careful estate planning by
inspiring estate planners, at the drafting stage, to keep careful records
of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will and to
ensure that those records reflect the intention the drafter hopes to
convey through plain language. The law of will construction should
impress upon estate planners the need for a contingency plan. To
develop such a plan responsibly, drafting attorneys must familiarize
themselves with the rules of construction and constructional
preferences that will be employed if the will they are drafting is
deemed ambiguous. It is good practice to assume such rules will
control the language of the document unless the rules themselves are
plainly rejected. Without an understanding of the different objectives
of interpretation and construction and of their application in
246sequence, an estate planner's methodical drafting techniques and
conviction that language is seldom, if ever, plain, could easily give
way to the reckless use of familiar verbal formulas and the
abandonment of careful contingency planning. Such would be the
undesirable product of conflating actual with attributed intent. The
blurring of the line between interpretation and construction may be
conceptually interesting to academics, but perceiving the bright line
between them better guides the activities of estate planners in their
struggle to safeguard testatorial intent.
CONCLUSION
The meaning of the words of one's will is determined by a com-
plex process of evaluation made up of, at stage one, interpretation,
and, at stage two, construction. It has long been recognized that inter-
pretation is the search for the actual intent conveyed by the language
of a legal instrument and that construction, by contrast, is the imposi-
tion of presumed intent upon the instrument when interpretation has
failed. If the language of the will is not plain and could be clarified by
the admission of extrinsic evidence, or where a latent ambiguity in the
language would be revealed and possibly resolved, the court will con-
sider extrinsic evidence of the circumstances existing at the time of
246See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3
cmt. c (2003) ("'[I]nterpretation' refers to the process of searching for the donor's actual inten-
tion by looking to the text of the document and extrinsic evidence. 'Construction' refers to the
process of attributing intention from constructional preferences and rules of construction.").
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the execution of the will. Unlike other areas of the law, precedent is
of limited usefulness in will interpretation, the theory being that the
peculiar factual circumstances surrounding the execution of a will
render it unlike any other.
The ALI's new Restatement governing wills and other donative
transfers rejects the distinction between will interpretation and con-
struction. Arguing that the current judicial practice is to consider ac-
tual and presumed intention simultaneously, the new Restatement
rejects the view that interpretation and construction are discrete parts
of a sequential process. To replace the old approach, the Restatement
proposes a one-step process in which courts will consider extrinsic
evidence and rules of construction simultaneously.
The Restatement's new formulation raises several matters of con-
cern. Foremost among these is that evidence of a judicial practice to
conflate interpretation and construction is lacking. Case law from a
multiplicity of states continues to make a clear distinction between
the two and to embrace the sequential process that has been and re-
mains an important component of the American legal tradition of will
interpretation. The judicial practice cited in justification of the new
formulation is employed primarily in cases involving disputes over
the quantum of estates--cases that because of their peculiar context
have historically received different treatment from those involving
problems with identification that the law of will interpretation was
designed to address. To adopt this particularized approach in cases of
will interpretation generally would vest courts with excessive discre-
tion and virtually invite them to ignore the tenet that, in every wills
case, discerning and executing the testator's intention is the primary
and paramount concern.
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